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ABSTRACT 
Aleksey Martynov 
Tailan Chi 
The optimal choice of a decision-making structure in alliances and other combined ventures is an 
important yet underexplored question. There is no si gle theory that predicts what types of 
decision-making structures will be optimal in different alliances. Existing research, while 
offering insights into the factors influencing the choice of a decision-making structure, does not 
offer a unified framework of such a choice or the performance implications of various choices. 
The present dissertation is an attempt to fill thisvoid.  
The first essay is a conceptual examination of the various factors that may affect the 
optimal choice of a decision-making structure. I build a general model and outline gaps in the 
existing research. The second essay considers the implication of interdependence between the 
collaborating firms and the internal complexity of the firms for the optimal choice of a decision-
making structure. I build a simulation model that shows how asymmetric interdependence and 
significant internal complexity of the partners can reduce the need to centralize decision making 
in alliances and other combined ventures. The third essay is a study of individual costs and 
benefits that each partner in an alliance enjoys or bea s as a result of collaboration under 
interdependence. I use computer simulations to show t at the size and sign of the individual 
performance benefits depends on the chosen decision-making structure and the pattern of 
interdependence between the collaborating firms.  
The significance of this dissertation lies in the examination of factors unrelated to 
opportunism as antecedents of an optimal choice of a decision-making structure, which is part of 
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a wider concept of governance mode choice. The findings in this dissertation contribute to the 
theory of the firm and to the theory of strategic alliances. 
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Essay 1: Determinants of decision-making structures in alliances 
and other combined ventures: Review of the literature and a 
theoretical model 
 
Introduction 
 
The choice of a governance mode in combined ventures such as strategic alliances, joint 
ventures, mergers, etc. is an important theoretical and empirical question. Governance mode 
choice affects outcomes of combined ventures (Leiblein, 2003; Sampson, 2004). High failure 
rates of strategic alliances (Park & Ungson, 2001) could be partially attributed to problems with 
choosing a proper governance mode.  
 Many studies view the problem of governance mode choice as the choice between equity-
based and non-equity-based participation (e.g. Pisano, 1989; Das & Teng, 1996; Hennart, 1988; 
Gulati, 1995; Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2004; Oxley, 1997). Other papers study the contracts that the 
parties design in order to protect their interests and ensure collaboration (e.g. Parkhe, 1993; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Reuer & Arino, 2002, 2006, 2007; Gong et al., 2007). Equity 
investments and contracts are examples of governance mechanisms that are available to the 
parties in a combined venture. Thus, an ostensible part of the governance mode choice consists 
of choosing the salient characteristics of the combined venture: equity investments and specific 
contractual stipulations. What often goes unstated is the problems that these governance 
mechanisms are supposed to address. 
According to Stiglitz (1989, 1991), any governance mode must solve two problems: (1) 
setting up an appropriate incentive structure; (2) designing an appropriate decision-making 
structure. An incentive structure is important because the parties’ interests are not necessarily 
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aligned when the parties enter the combined venture. A properly designed incentive structure 
will ensure that the parties are trying to reach the same goals. A decision-making structure is 
important because contracts are incomplete (Hart, 1988; Hart & Moore, 1999) and not every 
contingency can be written into a contract. The parties have to agree how decisions will be made 
and who will make them. 
The theory of incentive alignment is relatively well-developed. Transaction cost 
economics (e.g. Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1988, 1991) and property rights theory (e.g. Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972; Hart & Moore, 1990, 1999) argue that incentive alignment is more easily 
reached when ownership of equity is involved. In addition, contracts usually include monitoring 
and enforcement clauses that impose costs for breach of agreement and thereby promote 
cooperation (Ryall & Sampson, 2009; Faems et al., 2008). Less is known about the antecedents 
and consequences of the choice of a decision-making structure (DMS). 
What determines the optimal choice of a DMS in inter-organizational relationships? 
There could be two answers to this question. One answer invokes the concepts of opportunism 
and exchange hazards. According to this logic, more centralized, hierarchical decision-making 
structures can be used to mitigate partner opportunism. Centralized decision making naturally 
follows from centralized ownership of assets (Das & Teng, 1996) which is used to curb 
opportunism (Williamson, 1991a; Foss, 1996a). In addition, centralized decision making may be 
contractually specified. Thus, we would expect to see longer and/or more detailed contracts in 
situations where exchange hazards are high. This line of reasoning has received solid empirical 
support (e.g. Masten & Crocker, 1985; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Deeds & Hill, 1999; 
Arrunada, Garricano, & Vazquez, 2001; Ryall & Sampson, 2009). 
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 The second function of a DMS is coordination. In many alliances and other similar 
combined ventures, two or more parties undertake a joint project. It is difficult to specify ex ante 
all the tasks that need to be completed and all the actions that need to be taken to complete those 
tasks. In addition, it may be unclear how to evaluate certain events and actions of the partners 
because their short-term or long-term consequences may be difficult to predict. The parties need 
to have a structure that will assign decision-making r ghts to a certain party under certain 
circumstances or, alternatively, will specify the procedure for joint decision making. Allocation 
of decision rights and joint decision making may matter even without opportunism (Saxton, 
1997). However, currently there is no single theory about when decision making should be 
coordinated or centralized and when it is optimal to decentralize decision making without 
invoking the concept of opportunism. 
 Traditional organization theory (OT) was concerned with the question of decision 
making. The “rational” school in early OT (e.g. Taylor, 1911; Fayol, 1949) emphasized the 
design of an organization as a machine that serves a well-defined purpose or goal. The work of 
all parts of this machine was supposed to support the movement of the whole toward reaching 
the goal. As a result, any organization was to be led by managers who determined what needed 
to be done and who would do it. Thus, the rational school in OT suggested centralized decision 
making as a necessary condition of a well-functioning organization. 
 A later approach took a more “natural” view of organizations. This approach, represented 
by the works of Mayo (1945), Barnard (1938), and Selznick (1949, 1952), concentrated on the 
more “human” side of organizations. “Natural systems” theorists considered some 
decentralization essential because it promoted worker motivation and participation. Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967) suggested that the rational design and centralized decision making were more 
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appropriate in stable environments while the natural design and decentralized decision making 
were more appropriate in changing environments. 
 Thus, organizational theorists were among the first to uggest that centralization or 
decentralization of decision making may depend on the characteristics of the environment in 
which the organization functions. Later research in management and strategy has added to the 
list of factors and environmental characteristics that may influence the choice of a decision-
making structure. 
Factors that may affect the choice of a DMS include knowledge substitution (Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996), the need for quick decision making (Eisenhardt  & Bourgeois, 1988; Marengo, 
1992), integration of knowledge (Grant, 1996), uncertainty and risk (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986, 1988; 
Kim & Burton, 2002), and complexity (Thompson, 1967; Simon, 1962). None of these factors 
necessarily invoke opportunism as an explaining factor. All of them ultimately rely on the 
presence of bounded rationality (Simon, 1945) of the participants in the transaction. 
The present paper is an attempt to give an answer to the question, “What factors affect 
the choice of a decision-making structure in combined ventures?” I will review the existing 
literature and synthesize the main conceptual arguments and empirical findings, outline 
unexplored areas, and suggest avenues for future research. 
 
DMS choice: Opportunism vs. other factors 
 
I would like to begin the discussion of DMS choice with a brief review of opportunism-related 
factors. This discussion will serve as a baseline to compare the findings of the opportunism-
based theories with non-opportunism-based arguments. 
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 A standard recommendation for dealing with opportunism in combined ventures is 
centralized or common ownership of assets. It has been argued that asset ownership would not 
matter in a “moral utopia” (Foss, 1996a) in which no-one is ever opportunistic. In the real world 
where opportunism is present, common asset ownership serves to mitigate opportunism by 
making the investor a residual claimant. Even if the investor is not the sole owner of the venture, 
he/she will be less likely to engage in opportunistic value appropriation because such actions are 
likely to decrease the value of his/her investment. In addition to residual claimancy, ownership of 
assets establishes residual control rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The 
owner of an asset has the rights to use this asset in any legally permitted way that has not been 
explicitly specified in the contract. The stipulations of the contract complement the residual 
rights of control to determine the decision-making structure. In many combined ventures, the 
contract that the parties have signed will limit the residual rights of control of the asset owner 
and give some rights to use the asset to the other parties. The contract may also specify more 
general decision rights regarding the operations of the alliance or joint venture. For example, the 
contract may impose limits on what some of the parties are allowed to do (Leblebici & Shalley, 
1996).  
 Existing research supports the notion of decision making rights as a factor that can 
mitigate opportunism. In a sample of contracts betwe n auto manufacturers and Spanish auto 
dealers, Arrunada, Garicano, & Vazquez (2001) found that the auto manufacturer had more 
decision rights when there was greater potential for opportunism and moral hazard of the dealer. 
In a similar argument, Das and Teng (1996) suggested that joint decision making inherent in 
equity alliances could serve to restrain partner opportunism in addition to the rewards and control 
systems. In general, the decision-making rights that come with ownership work to mitigate 
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opportunism. In terms of optimal contract design, a party will tend to retain more decision-
making rights if it is more vulnerable to the other parties’ opportunism (Arrunada, Garicano, & 
Vazquez, 2001). 
 What other factors could affect the choice of a DMS? In order to answer this question, let 
us turn to the nature of a DMS. I will examine the concept of decision making and show why a 
DMS matters. 
 
Decision-making structures without opportunism 
 
The concept of decision making is inextricably tied to the concept of choice. If no choice exists, 
no decisions need to be made. Intuitively, it seems clear that decision making will matter more in 
situations where there are more options available to the parties, where the options are more 
varied, or where consequences of the various choices are more significant. The existence of 
options may not have to do anything with opportunism. I would like to survey the literatures that 
explore non-opportunism-related antecedents of decision-making structure choice. 
 
Decision making and knowledge substitution 
 
Conner and Prahalad (1996) suggested that differencs i  knowledge of the various parties may 
be one reason why decision making needs to be centralized. The focus of their paper was on the 
knowledge substitution effect that occurs when one party (“the manager”) has valuable 
knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another party (“the employee”). Conner and Prahalad 
argue that in this case it will be optimal for “the employee” to sign an open-ended employment 
9 
 
contract that delegates the decision-making rights to “the manager.” In employment contracts, 
the valuable knowledge of “the manager” is substituted for the relatively less valuable 
knowledge of “the employee.” Now, “the manager” does not have to explain why something 
needs to be done – he/she may simply order “the employee” to do something according to “the 
manager’s” decision.  
 The logic that Conner and Prahalad (1996) use is intriguing and potentially insightful, yet 
it breaks down under close scrutiny. In particular, the implicit assumption that Conner and 
Prahalad make is that “the employee” is not rational. If “the employee” believes that “the 
manager” has superior knowledge, it will be rational for “the employee” to submit to “the 
manager’s” directions without any employment-type contract. If “the employee” does not believe 
that “the manager” has superior knowledge, it is not clear why “the rational employee” would 
sign such an open-ended employment-type contract in the first place. Thus, irrational behavior of 
“the employee” needs to be assumed: “the employee” b lieves that “the manager” has superior 
knowledge but refuses to follow “the manager’s” instructions without having signed an 
employment contract. Barring irrational behavior, the only reason for “the employee” to sign 
such a contract would be the managerial control over some of the assets that are necessary to do 
the job1 in the presence of opportunism hazards (cf. Holmström & Roberts, 1998). Thus, 
knowledge substitution alone is not sufficient to explain the existence of employment-type 
contracts. 
 Despite the failure of Conner and Prahalad’s (1996) theory to explain the existence of 
employment contracts, their reasoning is applicable to the choice of a decision-making structure. 
In particular, their theory predicts that it is optimal to allocate decision making rights to the party 
                                                          
1 The manager may be the owner of the assets or an agent of the owner. The important fact here is that e manager 
controls the assets that the employee needs to do the j b. 
10 
 
that has critical, inalienable knowledge (Hart & Moore, 1990)2. If this critical knowledge is 
difficult to transfer to other parties (e.g. because it is tacit), decentralized or consensus-based 
decision making does not make sense. Decentralized decision making in such situations would 
result in worse decisions due to inferior knowledge of other parties (Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 
1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1995). Consensus-based decision making may also result in protracted 
negotiations in which each party will try to convince others of the superiority of its solution. The 
only complication of centralized decision making is how to determine whether any one of the 
parties has critical knowledge.  
 
Decision making under environmental and task uncertainty 
 
Another reason why decision making may matter withou  opportunism is uncertainty that stems 
from a lack of perfect information about the world. Pioneering research in this direction was 
done by Sah & Stiglitz (1986, 1988). They studied stylized firms making decisions about what 
projects to adopt. The key feature of those projects was lack of perfect information about their 
true value. Sah & Stiglitz (1986) studied hierarchies and polyarchies as their decision-making 
structures. A hierarchy is a structure in which the project is approved if each of N decision 
makers in the firm approves it. A polyarchy is a struc ure in which the project is approved if any 
one of N decision makers in the firm approves it. In their 1988 paper, Sah and Stiglitz also 
introduce a consensus-based structure (“committee”) hat approves a proposal if n members out 
of all N members of the committee accept the proposal (1 <= n  N). Polyarchies in general 
accept the greatest number of proposals. Hierarchies accept the smallest number of proposals. 
                                                          
2 It may be difficult to ascertain which party has criti al knowledge. However, I will ignore this complication in 
order to concentrate on DMS choice in principle. 
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The acceptance rates of committees decreases with an increase in n. The reverse side of the 
acceptance rate is the quality of proposals. The average quality of proposals accepted by a 
hierarchy will be the highest; the average quality of proposals accepted by a polyarchy will be 
the lowest. A committee will accept higher quality proposals on average with an increase in n, 
while the number of proposals accepted will decrease. 
 When might it be beneficial for a strategic alliance or a joint venture to use a hierarchy-
like decision-making structure? Hierarchies described y Sah and Sliglitz minimize the 
acceptance rate of bad proposals. This will be the most valuable when the cost of making a 
mistake is very high, for example in the aerospace industry. On the other hand, a decentralized 
decision-making structure (a polyarchy) will be adopted when it is costly for the partners to let a 
“good” project escape their field of vision, while the cost of accepting a “bad” project is not very 
high. Polyarchies maximize the number of projects approved. Such structures might be adopted 
in alliances that engage in basic or exploratory research where the goal is to explore the 
maximum possible number of different projects. 
 Another factor that may affect the adoption of a more hierarchical or a more polyarchical 
structure is the expected quality of the projects. If the average potential project is expected to be 
of low quality, the hierarchy is the best structure because it will weed out a greater number of 
“bad” projects. If the average potential project is expected to be of high quality, a polyarchy may 
be the most efficient structure because it will retain a greater number of “good” projects. In 
addition, the level of uncertainty regarding the potential quality of the projects is likely to be 
positively related to the use of hierarchical decision making. Well-defined projects that are 
expected to yield predictable payoffs can be chosen in a decentralized way while ill-defined 
projects with highly uncertain payoffs are likely to be chosen hierarchically. 
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This line of reasoning has received empirical support. For example, Macher (2006) found 
that ill-structured problems were more likely to be solved hierarchically in a sample of 
semiconductor manufacturers. Similarly, Lerner & Malmendier (2010) studied partnerships 
between research-based biotech firms and financing pharmaceutical firms. They found that the 
financing firm was more likely to have unconditional termination rights if there was no 
specifiable lead product at the outset. While this latter result may be explained using the concept 
of opportunism (the financing firm held key decision rights to guard against potential shirking of 
the biotech firm), it is also consistent with the id a that key decisions will be centralized when 
severe uncertainty is present. Colombo & Delmastro (2004) found that delegation of decision 
making to plant managers in large companies was positively related to the size of the company 
and the number of levels in the corporate hierarchy. T is finding is consistent with the idea that 
polyarchical decision making is best when there are more decisions (due to information overload 
of top managers) and with the previously discussed id a that decision making should be 
delegated when the top management does not have all the necessary knowledge. 
 The importance of the research by Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) for this discussion lies in 
the fact that the decision-making structures studied by Sah and Stiglitz did not use the concept of 
opportunism. The performance differences that emerged among the decision-making structures 
in their models were due to differences in the quality of projects and the uncertainty regarding 
the incoming information. Thus, Sah and Stiglitz were among the first researchers who formally 
showed how the choice of a decision-making structure may result in performance differentials 
without invoking the concept of opportunism. 
 Further work on the importance of decision making structures was done by Kim and 
Burton (2002). Using modeling techniques similar to th se employed by Sah and Stiglitz, Kim 
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and Burton showed that the effect of centralization of decision making on the duration, cost, and 
quality of projects depended on task uncertainty. In particular, centralized structures resulted in 
longer project times and higher costs under medium or high task uncertainty. However, under all 
levels of task uncertainty (low, medium, and high), centralized structures resulted in better 
quality of decisions (the difference was very large under medium and high task uncertainty). 
These results further confirmed the importance of decision-making structures in situations of 
environmental and task uncertainty even when opportunism is not an issue. 
 
Decision-making in rapidly moving markets 
 
Sometimes, the value of a decision may greatly depend on the speed at which the market is 
moving. Making a well-considered, high-quality decision may matter less than making an 
acceptable decision quickly. Fast-paced markets will most likely demand fast decision making. 
The more decision makers are involved in the decision, the more time the decision will likely 
take. A hierarchy similar to one described by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) may be counterproductive 
in fast-paced markets. A project has to be evaluated by all levels of the hierarchy before it is 
approved. A polyarchy requires only one decision maker to approve a project. Thus, polyarchies 
may be more suitable in fast-paced environments than hierarchies. 
 Hierarchies and polyarchies described in Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) are not the only 
possible decision-making structures. Decision making could be centralized at the top of the 
organization or alliance or delegated to the individual parties. According to the results of Wally 
and Baum (1994), centralization of decision making was positively related to the speed of 
decision making in a sample of York County, Pennsylvania manufacturers. One reason for that 
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could be politics that may play a prominent role in decentralized firms (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 
1988). Also, Radner (1992) argued that decentralization of decision making leads to a loss of 
control which may be detrimental in fast-paced markets.  
Based on simulation models, Marengo (1992) found that in stable markets, centralized 
structures outperformed decentralized structures initially; then the difference disappeared. In a 
regularly changing environment, the decentralized structure outperformed the centralized 
structure. Finally, in a randomly changing environment, the centralized structure outperformed 
the decentralized structure initially. Then, the difference diminished but did not disappear. 
Marengo’s models involved agents learning about the s ates of the world. Based on incoming 
information about the success of past actions, agents modified their existing rules and generated 
new ones. The difference between the centralized and decentralized structures was in the 
presence of direct ties between “the shop level” and the environment in the decentralized 
structure, while in the centralized structure, it was the central management only that had access 
to information from the environment. Marengo’s results suggest that not only the speed of 
change but also the presence or absence of pattern in change may affect the choice of optimal 
decision-making structures, and that centralized decision making has certain advantages even 
though it may reduce the amount of information processed by the organization. 
 
Decision-making structures and integration of knowledge 
 
Grant (1996) argued that an important function of the firm is integration of knowledge of its 
individual members. In all but the smallest firms, information and knowledge are decentralized 
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(Radner, 1992). Any rational decision is based on certain information3. A problem with firms, 
alliances, and joint ventures is that the person making the decision does not usually have full 
information. What is more, the necessary information may be dispersed throughout the 
organization. In order to make a decision, the decision maker may need to (1) ascertain who has 
the relevant information, and (2) obtain the necessary information from the party or parties that 
have it. These two problems are different and requir  different solutions. 
 Discovering a source of relevant information may be difficult. The most obvious way of 
looking for information is by asking the people whose duties directly relate to the information 
being sought. For example, if the CEO needs to make a d cision about investing in a project and 
the information needed is the amount of liquid capital that the firm has, the CFO will be the most 
obvious source of this information. However, many decisions need information whose location 
in the firm is unclear. In this case, the decision maker may seek the input of many people. For 
example, the decision maker may specify the information need and announce it to all employees 
in the firm. If the decision maker has much of the rel vant information and only needs a 
relatively small part to “complete the picture”, it is likely that some of the newly acquired 
information will be relevant to make a good decision. Complications may arise if none of the 
people in the firm or alliance have the necessary information; if the information arriving from 
different people is fragmented and needs to be integra d prior to use; or if the decision maker 
cannot distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information due to his/her lack of relevant 
knowledge and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
 Having received communication from different people in the organization does not mean 
that the decision maker will be able to make an informed decision. First, the information that was 
received must be interpreted (Daft & Lengel, 1986; March, 1987). It could be argued that 
                                                          
3 If there is no information upon which to make a decision, then any decision is as good as another. 
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information becomes knowledge only after it has been assimilated and integrated into the 
existing cognitive schemata of the person (Dretske; 1981; Nonaka, 1994). A decision maker may 
be unable to assimilate new information if (1) it is communicated in an unclear way; (2) it 
conflicts with the existing beliefs of the decision maker; (3) the person receiving the information 
does not have the absorptive capacity to assimilate it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
 In many firms, decision making is concentrated at the top of the firm, usually within the 
top management team (TMT). However, many other firms decentralize decision making. 
Generally, with an increase in the amount of information that the TMT members lack, decision 
making should be delegated to lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. The hypothesis that 
decision making will be more decentralized in firms with greater information dispersion has 
received empirical support (Breshanan, Brynjolfsson, & Hitt, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2007). 
 Alliances and other IORs are not fundamentally different from single firms in this 
respect. It makes sense to decentralize decision making if key information is possessed by 
different parties. This will be especially true if the information in question is either difficult to 
communicate (tacit knowledge) or proprietary (knowledge that needs to be protected from leaks). 
On the other hand, if the combined venture is commonly wned (e.g. a joint venture) and if the 
managers of the combined venture possess the necessary information, it makes sense to 
centralize decision making at the top. 
 There has been less research on the effects of information decentralization in combined 
ventures on the choice of DMS compared to similar research within firms. This constitutes a 
potentially fruitful avenue of future empirical inquiry. 
 To summarize the arguments based on integration of k owledge: centralization of 
decision making will be positively related to centralization of key information and knowledge 
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within the firm. The less knowledge the top managers have, the more decision-making rights will 
be delegated to the lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. The same argument applies to 
alliances. We will expect to see more centralization in decision making in alliances if the key 
knowledge is available to the people who are supposed to manage the alliance activities in a 
centralized fashion. 
 
Decision-making structures and complexity 
 
Many alliances are characterized by significant complexity that may make decision making 
difficult. There are different kinds of complexity; each of them will have a special effect on the 
choice of the decision-making structure. 
 The first kind of complexity that is described in the literature concerns uncertainty and 
the number of items that need to be considered before a decision can be made (e.g. Thompson, 
1967; Astley et al., 1982). Due to the cognitive limitations of decision makers, very complex 
problems will tend to be solved in a decentralized fashion (Astley et al., 1982). This type of 
decision making is similar to distributed computing that is used in modern computer systems. 
When the amount of information that needs to be processed exceeds the capacities of a single 
computer, engineers can program several computers working in parallel so that each one of them 
will solve part of the problem. An obvious complication of using this approach in organizations 
is the need for subsequent integration of individually obtained solutions. It may happen that the 
individual decision makers have come up with incompatible or conflicting solutions. The 
problem of dealing with this type of complexity is conceptually similar to the problem of 
integration of knowledge dispersed throughout the organization that was discussed earlier. 
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 The second type of complexity that exists in organiz tions and alliances arises because of 
the presence of multiple simultaneous interactions among the various decisions and activities. 
This type of complexity was first treated in substanti l detail by Herbert Simon (1962). He 
suggested that the presence of multiple interactions among parts of the system complicated the 
task of management. Each change in the organization may have multiple consequences in other 
parts of the organization that are not always obvious. Thus, managing a complex system such as 
a firm or a combined venture will usually entail managing interactions of the resources as well as 
the resources themselves. 
 One approach to dealing with complexity is modularizing the organization. The concept 
of modularizing refers to containing most interactions within relatively compact modules and 
minimizing interactions among modules. Baldwin (2008) suggests that modularity of the 
organization will generally mirror modularity of the production technology. Decentralization of 
decision making is possible if the technology itself is modular. Then the firm or combined 
venture can break up the task into a series of subta ks and assign each of these subtasks to 
divisional managers or managers of each individual party in the combined venture. However, if 
the overall task cannot be broken apart into modules, the management of the entire firm or 
combined venture will have to have a much more active role in the coordination of efforts of the 
divisions or parties. The hypothesis that the structure of the organization will generally mirror 
the structure of the technology was suggested by Henderson and Clark (1990). Colfer and 
Baldwin (2010) surveyed the literature and found that e mirroring hypothesis has received 
good empirical support. In particular, within-firms tests found support for the mirroring 
hypothesis in 68 percent of all empirical tests, with another five percent of all tests providing 
partial support. Support was lower in across-firm studies (mostly alliances and joint ventures). 47 
19 
 
percent of all across-firm tests supported the mirroring hypothesis, with another 23 percent 
providing partial support. Notably, a total of 26 percent of all across-firm tests provided results 
that were contrary to the mirroring hypothesis (this number was 23 percent for within-firm tests). 
Overall, it could be noted that there is some evidence suggesting that organizational structure 
does mirror the structure of the problem that needs to be solved; however, this evidence is far 
from conclusive. 
 A similar approach to the problem of complexity was t ken by Nickerson and Zenger 
(2004). They suggested that decomposability of the task will affect the optimal governance mode 
choice. If the task is decomposable, which means that it can be broken up into a series of 
independent subtasks, the optimal governance mode for solving this task will be market 
contracting with independent decision making by each party involved. If the task is nearly 
decomposable, which means that there are some non-trivial interactions among the sub-tasks, but 
their number is not too large, the optimal governance mode will be the authority-based hierarchy. 
Centralized decision making that is a characteristic of authority-based hierarchies will facilitate 
coordination of activities among the interdependent par s. Finally, if the problem is non-
decomposable, which means that the sub-tasks interact very significantly, the optimal 
governance mode will be the consensus-based hierarchy. The main difference between 
consensus-based and authority-based hierarchies is the mode of decision making. In the 
authority-based hierarchy, decisions are made centrally by the top management of the firm or 
alliance. In the consensus-based hierarchy, decisions are made via agreement of all the parties 
involved. The conceptual arguments of Nickerson and Zenger (2004) are based upon the need for 
communication as a function of interdependence. If interdependence is very low or non-existent, 
the parties do not need to communicate and decisions ca  be made in a fully decentralized 
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fashion. If interdependence is present but not veryhigh, the central management may play the 
role of an information-processing center that gathers information from all parties and makes 
decisions based upon it. The centralized decision making characterizing an authority-based 
hierarchy will serve to mitigate the problem of externalities that interdependent agents may 
impose on one another. Finally, when interdependence is very high, fully centralized decision 
making is likely to break down because the top management will be overloaded with 
information. The most obvious solution to this problem is partial decentralization of information 
processing (Radner, 1992) while decision making is done via consensus. 
 
Summary of DMS choice as a function of various factors 
 
In order to summarize the findings and arguments of he various streams of research, I would 
like to present the following table. 
 
Table 1 
Decision-making structure choice from the point of view of existing theories 
 
Theory Factors that affect 
DMS choice 
Main predictions and 
findings 
Representative 
papers 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Opportunism 
Bounded rationality 
Decision making will be 
centralized when 
opportunism hazards are 
significant 
Hennart (1988) 
Hennart (1993) 
Arrunada, Garicano, 
& Vazquez (2001) 
Knowledge-
based view 
Knowledge 
substitution effect 
Decisions will be made by 
one party if this party has 
valuable knowledge that is 
difficult to transfer to other 
parties. 
Conner (1996) 
Conner and Prahalad 
(1996) 
Decision making 
under uncertainty 
Quality of 
proposals 
Risk tolerance 
 
 
Decision making will be 
decentralized if making a 
mistake is not very costly 
and if the average quality 
of proposals is high. 
Sah and Stiglitz 
(1986, 1988) 
Kim & Burton (2002) 
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Uncertainty 
Quality of problem 
definition 
Decisions will be 
centralized if the problem 
is ill-defined and when 
there is a lot of uncertainty 
 
Macher (2006) 
Lerner & Malmendier 
(2010) 
Decision making 
in changing 
environments 
Speed and pattern 
of market change 
Decisions will be 
centralized if high speed of 
decision making is 
important. 
Decisions will be 
centralized if the market is 
stable or changes 
unpredictably. 
Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois (1988) 
Wally & Baum 
(1994) 
Marengo (1992) 
Integration of 
knowledge 
The locus of 
knowledge in the 
organization 
Decision making will be 
decentralized if the 
managers of the firm 
(alliance) do not possess 
information and knowledge 
necessary to make 
decisions.  
Grant (1996) 
Breshanan, 
Brynjolfsson, & Hitt 
(2002) 
Acemoglu et al. 
(2007) 
Dewitt & Jones 
(2001) 
Complexity 
theory 
Cognitive 
limitations; the 
number of items to 
consider 
 
 
 
Interactions among 
sub-problems 
Cognitive limitations of 
decision makers will 
necessitate decentralized 
problem solving; the 
problem of coordination 
and integration emerges. 
 
Increasing interactions 
among sub-problems will 
drive centralization of 
decision making. 
Thompson (1967) 
Astley et al. (1982) 
 
 
 
Simon (1962) 
Nickerson & Zenger 
(2004) 
Colfer & Baldwin 
(2010) 
Aggarwal, 
Siggelkow, & Singh 
(2011) 
 
Based on Table 1, the antecedents of centralized decision making can be classified into three 
groups according to their locus: 
(1) General environmental factors: 
a. Adverse environment that increases the probability of making mistakes and raises 
the cost of making a mistake 
b. A need for quick decision making (e.g. a fast-changing environment) 
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c. High environmental uncertainty 
(2) Transaction-specific factors: 
a. An ill-defined problem that the parties are trying to solve 
b. Many interactions among the sub-problems that need to be solved 
c. Relatively few decisions need to be made  
d. Opportunism hazards caused by the characteristics of the transaction (e.g. 
transaction-specific investments need to be made) 
(3) Subjective, personal characteristics of the participants in the transaction 
a. Valuable, difficult-to-transfer knowledge that is owned by one party 
b. Opportunism hazards caused by characteristics of the parties (e.g. propensity of 
one of the parties to engage in opportunistic behavior) 
c. Low risk tolerance of the parties 
 
According to this classification, centralized decision making can help solve or alleviate many 
different problems. All of these factors are based on the assumption of bounded rationality of the 
transacting parties that does not allow them to write and enforce a complete contingent claims 
contract in a cost- and time-efficient manner. As a result, a centralized authority that has the 
power to make decisions not specified in the contract might be beneficial. 
 
As noted previously, the importance of a decision-making structure stems from contract 
incompleteness. If contracts were complete, a decision-making structure would not matter 
because the contract would specify every possible stuation with every duty unambiguously 
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assigned to specific parties. An incomplete contract makes DMS choice important. As a result, 
the more incomplete the contract, the more important the DMS choice becomes. 
  
What conditions lead to contract incompleteness? In general, incomplete contracts are an 
outcome of bounded rationality of humans. The more severe the problems imposed by bounded 
rationality, the more incomplete the contract will be. Bounded rationality itself is a result of 
complexity and uncertainty that exceed the capacities of the human brain. Table 1 presented the 
factors that affect DMS choice. Most of those factors are related to uncertainty and complexity. 
According to Table 1, centralization of decision making will be beneficial if there is a lot of 
uncertainty and complexity in the environment, the transaction, and the knowledge of the 
participants. These same factors affect the extent of bounded rationality and contract 
incompleteness. In addition, as Nickerson & Zenger (2004) argued, complexity and uncertainty 
affect the chances of opportunistic behavior by affecting the appropriability regime. As a result, 
we would expect to see more opportunistic behavior under severe uncertainty and complexity. 
Individual-level characteristics of the parties will affect opportunism (due to the varying 
propensities of different parties to engage in opportunistic behavior) and the extent of bounded 
rationality (due to the varying capabilities of different parties to process information and write 
effective contracts). 
 
Based on the previous discussion, the following conceptual model can be drawn: 
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Figure 1: Theoretical model 
 
 
Discussion: Summary and future directions 
The previous discussion has provided various reasons why decision making matters in firms and 
alliances. Some theories, such as transaction cost e nomics and property rights theory, suggest 
that centralized decision making combined with an appropriate incentive structure may help 
contain opportunism. Other theories, such as the knowledge-based view of the firm, complexity 
theory, and environmental analysis, suggest that decision making may be important for reasons 
unrelated to opportunism. While none of these theories explain centralized ownership of assets, 
which is at the heart of the modern theory of the firm (Foss, 1996b), they help predict an 
important aspect of governance mode choice which the modern theory of the firm does not 
explain adequately. Having covered the conceptual arguments and empirical findings of the 
The choice or a 
decision making 
structure 
Incomplete 
contracting 
Extent of 
bounded 
rationality 
Uncertainty 
(environmental, 
transactional) 
Complexity 
(environmental, 
transactional) 
Opportunism 
The choice of an 
incentive 
structure 
Individual party 
characteristics 
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various non-opportunism-based theories of DMS choice, I would like to outline the existing 
blind spots and suggest areas for future research in these theories. 
Empirical testing of theory is a vital part of scientific inquiry. However, the theories 
outlined above have not received adequate testing. There are various reasons for that. One reason 
is that governance has traditionally been associated with asset ownership modes. Much existing 
research has been devoted to determining when an alli ce is likely to be equity-based. While 
equity investments are important, they are not the only governance mechanism available to 
alliance parties. Other governance mechanisms are contracts and relational governance. All of 
these mechanisms can be used to align incentives and et up a decision-making structure 
(Stiglitz, 1989, 1991). This dual role of governance mechanisms may complicate empirical 
testing. In the world where opportunism exists, the us  of centralization of ownership and more 
detailed contracts as means to align incentives may correlate with centralized decision making. 
Future researchers will need to separate decision making and incentive alignment as reasons for 
choosing a specific governance mechanism. 
The second reason for limited empirical testing of n n-opportunism-based theories is 
difficulty in measurement of certain key constructs. For example, according to the knowledge-
based view, centralization of decision making is likely if one party possesses critical knowledge 
that is difficult to transfer to other parties. It may be difficult to measure possession of such 
knowledge given the fact that such knowledge is likely to be tacit. Likewise, complexity of the 
problem that the alliance is facing is not easy to measure. The concept of complexity is based on 
the existence of multiple interactions. Observing all interactions in a complex system is an 
almost impossible task. Many of those interactions are unclear even to specialists. Thus, 
researchers would have to resort to proxies, many of which are far removed from the 
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phenomenon of complexity. Much existing research that uses the concept of complexity is based 
on formal modeling and simulations because these methods allow researchers to capture the 
relationships without the need to measure the construct  and control for multiple confounding 
factors (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Ganco and Agarwal, 2009; 
Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011). 
The goal of governance mode choice is improved effici ncy and increased performance 
(Williamson, 1991b, 1999). One weakness of existing research on decision making structures is 
the relative lack of attention to performance consequences of DMS choice. While we may know 
when centralization of decision making makes sense, we do not know what happens when DMS 
choice differs from theory prescriptions. How much does overcentralization of decision making 
damage the performance of a combined venture? What about insufficient centralization? Which 
deviation from the optimal degree of centralization is more damaging? Future researchers should 
address these questions in the same way as previous researchers have addressed costs of 
misalignment of ownership structures and exchange chara teristics (e.g. Nickerson & Silverman, 
2003; Sampson, 2004). 
An important difference between combined ventures and single firms is the fact that 
alliance performance is not as easy to measure. While performance metrics are fairy well-
established for single firms (e.g. ROA, ROE, operating margin, etc.), no such commonly 
accepted metrics exist for alliances and other similar combined ventures (see Arino, 2003; 
Lunnan & Haugland, 2008 for examples of measures of alliance performance). In particular, 
performance may be measured at the individual firm level or the whole combined venture level. 
While performance at the level of the whole combined v nture is important, managers of the 
individual parties will also want to know how the alliance contributes to the performance of their 
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firms. Thus, researchers will be well advised to study performance differences between the 
partners as a result of adopting certain DMS. In addition, researchers will need to find structural 
characteristics of combined ventures and the partnering firms that affect the relative performance 
of the parties (Hennart, 2006). 
One way to approach the problem of performance is by constructing formal computer 
simulations of combined ventures. This approach was successfully used to study performance of 
individual firms as a function of complexity and other structural characteristics (e.g. Levinthal, 
1997; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). However, studies of alliances 
using computer simulations are yet to be developed (a notable exception is Aggawal, Siggelkow, 
& Singh, 2011). Nickerson & Zenger (2004) offered a knowledge-based theory of the firm and 
of optimal governance mode choice largely based on the findings of single-firm studies (e.g. 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Their theory has not been t sted in either the simulation framework 
or empirically. Simulation research is valuable because it may offer unique insights into behavior 
of complex systems such as alliances. Based on predictions derived from simulations, 
researchers may create more precise empirical models. 
To sum up, the following topics need to be addressed in future research on decision-
making structures: 
1. Empirical testing of various antecedents of DMS choi e. It is important to test for both 
opportunism-related and non-opportunism-related factors simultaneously so as to obtain 
more precise estimates of the effects of each. 
2. Development of good measures of such constructs as complexity and criticality of 
knowledge. 
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3. Testing of consequences of DMS choice and of the misfit between the optimal DMS and 
the actual choice of the alliance participants. 
4. Testing for performance consequences of DMS choice both at the level of the whole 
alliance and the individual firm level. 
5. Developing simulation models to derive empirically testable predictions. 
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Conclusion 
The choice of a decision-making structure in inter-organizational relationships does not always 
depend on the presence of opportunism. Existing modeling and empirical research supports the 
idea that centralization or decentralization of decision making may be affected by other factors 
such as uncertainty, complexity of the problem, risk tolerance, or the locus of critical knowledge 
in the organization. Transaction cost theory has trditionally concentrated on provision of 
incentives in the presence of opportunism as the primary goal of governance mode choice. The 
surveyed theories suggest that the choice of a decision-making structure, which is the other part 
of a governance mode choice, is also affected by factors unrelated to opportunism. Further 
research is needed to investigate when certain decision-making structures are optimal and how 
deviations from the optimal choice affect organizational performance. 
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Essay 2: Performance of various decision-making structures in 
combined ventures as a function of firm complexity and 
asymmetric interdependence: Insights from a simulation study 
 
Introduction 
 
When the managers of two initially autonomous firms consider collaboration, they face the 
problem of choosing a governance mode. The two firms may have various reasons to seek 
collaboration, including (but not limited to) resource and activity sharing, synergies among their 
existing resources, developing new resources, etc. Many forms of collaboration give rise to 
interdependence between the parties (Gulati & Singh, 1998). I will call a combination of two 
previously autonomous firms a ‘combined venture’ between the two parties. Examples of 
combined ventures are alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions. The two parties in 
a combined venture have to use a certain combination of governance mechanisms to structure the 
collaboration toward the achievement of certain goals. Examples of governance mechanisms are 
equity investments (e.g. Hennart, 1988; 1991), contracts (e.g. Parkhe, 1993; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002; Reuer & Arino, 2007), and relational governance (e.g. Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006).  
Regardless of the chosen combination of mechanisms, any governance mode has to solve 
two separate problems: (1) alignment of incentives of the two previously autonomous parties; (2) 
setting up a decision-making structure (DMS) that will determine who will make decisions and 
how those decisions will be made (Stiglitz, 1989, 19 ). The problem of incentive alignment 
arises because of the potential difference in the parties’ objectives exacerbated by the threat of 
opportunism (Foss, 1996a). A DMS is important because of contract incompleteness (Anderson 
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& Dekker, 2005): a DMS will determine how decisions will be made in situations when contract 
boundaries are reached.  
 Previous research has started to show that the performance of a combined venture 
depends on the alignment between the chosen governance mode and the characteristics of the 
transaction (Sampson, 2004; Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011). In light of the previous 
discussion, a governance mode choice affects the performance of a combined venture via (1) 
incentive alignment mechanisms; (2) the chosen DMS. Imperfect incentive alignment may lead 
to opportunism-related hazards such as shirking (Hennart, 1993; Madhok, 1996) or hold-up 
(Williamson, 1985). The optimal level of incentive alignment will thus depend on the divergence 
between the parties’ goals and their propensities to engage in opportunistic behavior. An 
improper DMS choice may result in insufficient coordination between the parties (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011). Determining antecedents of optimal DMS 
choice is a goal of this paper. 
 While it has been suggested that incentive alignment and DMS choice are closely related 
(e.g. Nickerson & Zenger, 2004), conceptually they are separate. Incentive alignment would not 
matter in a moral utopia characterized by absence of opportunism (Foss, 1996a). The importance 
of decision making structures ultimately stems from the existence of bounded rationality of the 
decision makers and contract incompleteness that do not allow the parties to specify all possible 
contingencies in advance. Contract incompleteness is likely to be a function of the complexity of 
the problem that the two parties are trying to solve (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). A highly 
complex problem characterized by multiple simultaneous interactions among the parties’ 
resources and activities may require greater integra ion in the form of more coordinated or even 
centralized decision making. This intuitively clear proposition was formulated by Nickerson and 
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Zenger (2004) and supported by the simulation results of Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh 
(2011). An important assumption that Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh made in their simulation 
models was the symmetric interdependence between th parties. Another assumption that they 
made was the fixed internal complexity of the parties, defined as the density of resource 
interactions owned by one partner. Therefore, what remains unexplored is the potential impact of 
interdependence asymmetry and the internal complexities of the two parties on the choice of the 
DMS and governance mode. Asymmetric interdependence may arise out of the properties of the 
technology used by the partner or differentials in the bargaining power of the two parties (e.g. 
Gulati & Sytch, 2007). As an example, consider the int rdependence between Ford and its 
suppliers. Arguably, Ford is less dependent on its suppliers than vice versa due to the differences 
in size and availability of alternative partners. Internal complexity of the parties is largely 
determined by the degree of sharing resources and activities across multiple departments and 
tasks inside each party (Simon, 1962). Some firms, such as those diversified in unrelated ways, 
are less complex because there is relatively littlesharing of resources and activities among their 
business units. Other firms, such as those diversifi d in closely related ways, are more complex, 
because there is a lot of sharing of resources and activities among their business units. The 
questions that I would like to explore are: (1) Does a greater asymmetry in interdependence 
between the parties increase or decrease the need for coordinated or centralized decision 
making? (2) Does a greater internal complexity of the parties increase or decrease the need for 
coordinated or centralized decision making? For example, if two unrelatedly-diversified firms 
consider collaboration, does it make sense for them to set up a less centralized or a more 
centralized decision-making structure? What if these firms become asymmetrically dependent on 
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each other? Does it increase or decrease the need to c ntralize decision making? Answering 
questions like these is the main contribution of this paper. 
 In this essay, I use the theory of decision making u der uncertainty (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986, 
1988) and the complexity theory of firms and alliances (Levinthal, 1997; Nickerson & Zenger, 
2004) to predict the benefits of centralization of decision making in combined ventures. I use 
agent-based simulations to show that both the degree of asymmetry in dependence between the 
parties and the internal complexities of the parties affect the benefits of centralization of decision 
making even when opportunism is absent. In the discussion section, I introduce opportunism 
back into the problem to show how my results would apply to the real world where opportunism 
hazards exist. My findings extend the work of Aggarw l, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011) and 
contribute to the theory of alliances and the theory of the firm. 
 
Literature review and research questions 
 
I would like to start my discussion of governance in combined ventures with two real-world 
examples. Doz (1996) described an alliance between Ciba-Geigy, a large Swiss-based 
pharmaceutical firm, and Alza, a small California-bsed biotechnology firm. The goal of the 
alliance was the development of advanced drug-delivery systems by Alza and their subsequent 
manufacturing and commercialization by Ciba. In order to align the interests of the two parties, 
Ciba took an equity stake in Alza. The two firms possessed complementary capabilities: Alza 
was an expert in drug discovery and initial testing while Ciba had expertise in the manufacturing 
and commercialization of drugs. The presence of this complementarity meant that this alliance 
had significant potential promise due to possible synergies between the two firms’ resources and 
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capabilities (King, Slotegraaf, and Kesner, 2008). The equity stake in Alza, taken by Ciba, was 
supposed to ensure that the two parties’ interests were aligned.  
 The outcome of this alliance, however, was far from ideal. While some new products 
were created and commercialized, the alliance was not nearly as successful as the partners had 
hoped. The main problem with this alliance was thatere was no centralized decision making 
structure that should have solved problems and improved the alliance performance. The 
significant reciprocal interdependence (Gulati and Singh, 1998) between Ciba and Alza called 
for greater coordination of decisions. It turned out that potential synergy may be difficult to 
implement in practice because such implementation requi es a number of coordinated actions 
and decisions to be made by both parties. If the number of actions and decisions to coordinate is 
sufficiently great and their consequences are not well known, the partners cannot always hope 
that coordination will happen automatically. They will need to set up some form of centralized 
decision-making structure (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004) which was lacking in the case of the 
Ciba-Alza alliance. 
 The second example is the alliance between Renault and Nissan, two large auto 
manufacturers (Burgelman and Leslie, 2008). One significant difference between the Renault-
Nissan alliance and the Ciba-Alza alliance is the presence of centralized decision making in 
Renault-Nissan. Both companies have the same CEO, Carlos Ghosn. This unified leadership 
means that decisions are made in the best interests of the entire alliance, not only of one of the 
partners. Both partners trust each other and are willing to take small, temporary losses if there is 
promise of large gains to the entire alliance later. As a result, Renault-Nissan is a very successful 
alliance in terms of performance. 
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 The two examples above show the critical importance of decision-making structures in 
combined ventures. Ownership structure is important but insufficient to explain the performance 
of a combined venture. Both Renault-Nissan and Ciba-Alz  are equity alliances. However, Ciba-
Alza used decentralized decision making while Renault-Nissan used centralized decision 
making. The difference in outcomes of these alliances may have been partially determined by the 
difference in the decision-making structures used. 
 
Governance mode choice in combined ventures 
 
The question of governance mode choice in combined ventures is closely related to the theory of 
the firm. Going back to Coase (1937), scholars have sought answers to the question “why do 
firms exist as islands of conscious power in a sea of markets?” and the related question “what 
explains the choice of a governance mode used to combine several productive resources?” These 
questions have traditionally been answered with the use of the concept of transaction costs. 
When costs of organizing an activity in the market exceed internal organization costs, the 
transaction will be internalized (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985, 1991). Another argument was 
presented by knowledge-based theorists (e.g. Conner, 1991; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992) who suggested that coordination of complex knowledge is another function of the 
firm and that this function goes beyond cost minimization. While knowledge-based arguments 
have been unable to explain centralized ownership of assets that characterizes modern firms (see 
Foss, 1996a, 1996b) and even the existence of long-term employment-like contracts (see Essay 1 
of this Dissertation), they have been helpful in explaining why firms need more centralized 
decision-making structures (DMS). In particular, knowledge-based arguments lay at the core of 
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the study by Nickerson and Zenger (2004) who suggested that coordination of complex 
knowledge and activities may be a reason why transacting parties may choose a more integrated 
governance mode. 
 The essence of the argument by Nickerson and Zenger (2004) is as follows. Increased 
interdependence of the parties in a transaction results in non-decomposability of the problem that 
the parties are trying to solve. Non-decomposability means that the problem cannot be divided 
into sub-problems that can be solved separately. The existence of a non-decomposable problem 
necessitates close coordination between the parties to make sure that the parties maximize joint 
gains and minimize negative externalities that uncoordinated action might generate. Nickerson 
and Zenger (2004) hypothesized that market-like governance with little coordination would only 
work when there was little interdependence between th  parties. When there is significant 
interdependence, the parties will have to move toward authority-based, hierarchical governance 
to mitigate negative externalities. Finally, when interdependence is very high, the parties will 
have to collaborate within a consensus-based hierarchy to tap into the knowledge and expertise 
of all participants in the transaction. 
 This line of reasoning received support in the simulation model developed by by 
Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011). Using agent-based simulation, they found that 
increased interdependence between the two parties increased benefits of centralized governance. 
The idea of Nickerson and Zenger (2004) that very high levels of interdependence would require 
consensus-based hierarchy did not receive support. Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011) 
found that the centralized decision-making authority performed best at the very high levels of 
interdependence while intermediate forms based on consensus were optimal at moderate levels 
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of interdependence. This finding necessitates reconsideration of interdependence and complexity 
as factors that affect the optimal degree of centralization. 
 
Interdependence within and between parties 
 
Interdependence between the transacting parties is not the only type of interdependence in 
combined ventures. The other type concerns interactions between resources and activities within 
each party. In order to differentiate between these two types, I will refer to interactions of 
resources and activities within one firm or party as the “complexity” of that firm or party, while 
the term “interdependence” will be reserved for the int r-party interactions within the framework 
of a combined venture. It is worth noting here that complexity of a firm is an internal property 
that exists separately from any combined venture while interdependence is a feature of a specific 
combined venture. 
 Herbert Simon (1962) was one of the first researchers who examined the concept of 
complexity. He stated that the presence of multiple int ractions among the firm’s resources and 
activities makes the task of managing such a firm co plex (hence the term “complexity”). In 
order to decrease complexity, firms can adopt more modular structures in which most 
interactions will be contained within compact modules while interactions across module 
boundaries are minimized. The prevalence of modular design in modern organizations, according 
to Simon (1962), is a means of making organizations more manageable. One implication of 
modular design is the reduction of the density of interactions across organizational units. Each 
unit in a modular organization becomes a separate pofit center that has all the necessary 
resources. A modular organization is forced to implement a strategy of unrelated diversification 
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or a strategy of inter-temporal economies in which resources and activities are not shared across 
module boundaries (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). This also means that related diversification 
strategies will use organizational designs that are not strictly modular. While this opens up 
opportunities for resource and activity sharing andresulting economies of scale and scope, it also 
means that management of such an organization becomes a ore complex task. 
 What happens when internally complex organizations f rm a combined venture? There 
could be two approaches to answering this question. One will evoke ideas from transaction cost 
theory. According to this line of reasoning, a complex organization may be subject to greater 
transaction costs in a combined venture due to a gre te  risk of disruption of its intricate system 
of interacting resources and activities. It may be the case that complex parties will require more 
centralized governance and decision making. According to the other approach, internally 
complex parties may be well-equipped to deal with the added interdependence that the combined 
venture brings. Managers in such organizations are likely to be used to coordinating interacting 
resources and activities. Besides, the interdependence added by the combined venture may be 
relatively small compared to the existing internal complexity of the parties. In this case, the 
parties may not require much centralization of decision making (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005).
 The existence of rival predictions from two different theories allows us to formulate my 
first research question: 
Question 1: How does the internal complexity of the parties affect the need to 
centralize decision making in a combined venture? 
Another factor that may affect the need to centralize decision making in a combined 
venture is asymmetry of interdependence. The conceptual model of Nickerson and Zenger 
(2004) and the simulation model of Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011) only considered 
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situations of symmetric interdependence. However, combined ventures may be characterized by 
asymmetric interdependence. In situations of asymmetric interdependence, one party’s actions 
may affect the other party’s performance more significantly than the other way around. Such 
asymmetric interdependence may arise out of unequal options that the parties have outside the 
combined venture (e.g. one party may have many morepotential partners) or out of the existing 
technology (e.g. a manufacturer may be affected much more by the demands of the distributor 
than the other way around). Transaction cost theory predicts that asymmetric interdependence 
may generate hold-up hazards, which would require greater integration between the parties 
(Pearce, 1997). In addition to hold-up, one party may have greater power over the other because 
it can impose greater externalities on the other party. Under arms-length market contracting, such 
power differentials may result in the less dependent party appropriating most of the returns from 
the combined venture. Going into a combined venture, he more dependent party may require 
greater integration to prevent such appropriation of returns4. On the other hand, asymmetric 
interdependence may create a “leader-follower” effect under which the more dependent party 
will simply have to adjust its strategy to the actions taken by the less dependent party. Such one-
sided adjustment may obviate the need for centralized coordination and decision making because 
coordination may happen almost automatically. 
As I have shown, there exist rival predictions based on previous research and theorizing. I 
can formulate my second research question: 
Question 2: How does the degree of asymmetry in interdependence between the parties 
affect the need to centralize decision making in a combined venture? 
 
                                                          
4 It is a separate question whether the less dependent party will agree to integrate. Casciaro and Piskor i (2006) 
found that less dependent parties often successfully resist integration in order to preserve the power relationship that 
asymmetric interdependence brings. 
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Decision-making structures (DMS) in combined ventures: the Sah and Stiglitz 
typology 
 
The importance of decision-making structures was formally studied by Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 
1988). They modeled the impact of different structures on the performance of a firm in the 
presence of multiple potential projects whose values w re uncertain. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) 
showed that a low average quality of projects made hierarchical decision making beneficial. 
Hierarchical decision making in Sah and Stiglitz’s papers meant that all decision makers had to 
approve of a decision before a project could be imple ented. This process minimized the 
number of projects implemented but assured the highest quality of those projects that were in 
fact implemented. The reverse was true when the average quality of the projects was high. In this 
case, a polyarchy (a decentralized structure in which any decision maker could approve a project 
alone) resulted in the best performance because many good projects were implemented. Sah and 
Stiglitz (1988) extended this logic to the case of committees, which approved a decision if a 
certain percentage of decision makers agreed. Committees are a “hybrid” structure that is most 
useful at intermediate levels of expected project quality. 
 Thus, according to Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988), decision-making structures can be 
classified according to the degree of consensus that they require. Decentralized structures like 
polyarchies are at one end of the spectrum and fully hierarchical structures are at the other end of 
the spectrum. Committee-like structures which require some consensus among the parties are an 
intermediate form. According to previous research on alliances and other combined ventures 
(e.g. Gulati & Singh, 1998; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004), we would expect to see polyarchical 
structures (resembling the market) when the need of co rdination is low. We would expect to see 
centralized and hierarchical structures (resembling mergers) when the need of coordination is 
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high. When the need of coordination is intermediate, we would expect to see intermediate 
structures such as committees (resembling alliances or joint ventures). 
 The typology of decision-making structures offered by Sah and Stiglitz is more general 
than the one tested by Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011). In their study of governance 
modes in alliances, Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh considered collaborating parties as 
consisting of the “alliance” part and the part that w s not involved in the alliance. Some of their 
alliances were managed in a decentralized fashion wth each party making its decisions without 
consulting with the other party. Other alliances were managed in a fully centralized structure 
similar to a merger. The intermediate governance forms that they modeled were a three-agent 
structure in which there was one agent running the aggregate “alliance” parts of the two parties 
(the alliance manager) and two agents running the rest of the two parties’ operations (managers 
of each party). In the “Self-governing alliance”, the alliance manager did not have to consult 
with the managers of the two parties. In the “Ratified alliance”, the parties’ managers had to 
approve the decisions of the alliance manager. 
The Sah and Stiglitz typology does not concern itself only with alliances but is 
conceptually applicable to any forms of combined ventures, from spot market contracts to fully 
centralized mergers. The Sah and Stiglitz typology suggests that alliances may be governed by 
consensus of the parties without forming a separate structure such as a free-standing joint 
venture. One of the goals of this paper is to model the general structures introduced by Sah and 
Stiglitz and compare the results to those obtained by Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh. 
 
In Table 2 below, I summarize the main decision-making structures modeled in this essay. 
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Table 2: Decision-making structures modeled in Essay 2 
DECISION-
MAKING 
STRUCTURE 
WHO 
GENERATES 
PROPOSALS? 
CRITERIA FOR 
EVALUATING 
PROPOSALS 
WHERE CAN IT BE 
USED MOST OFTEN? 
Fully decentralized – 
no coordination 
between the parties 
Individual parties Performance of the 
proposing party 
Market-based exchanges; 
contract-based alliances with 
little coordination 
Consensus-based 
(two versions)  
Individual parties (1) Performance of 
the proposing party 
and the other party;  
(2) Performance of 
the proposing party 
and the combined 
venture 
Strategic alliances with 
significant coordination 
between the partners 
Divisional Individual parties Performance of the 
combined venture 
Free-standing joint ventures; 
divisional mergers 
Centralized The combined 
venture 
Performance of the 
combined venture 
Mergers with fully 
centralized management 
 
 
MODEL 
 
Assumptions 
 
In order to find answers to the stated research questions, I ran computer simulations based on a 
formal model. Before I describe the model and its implementation, I would like to discuss my 
assumptions. Any formal model is a simplification of reality. Even though the assumptions that 
my model makes are standard in this stream of reseach (e.g. Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Ganco 
& Agarwal, 2009; Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011), I would like to explain why my 
simplification of reality is likely to capture the important aspects of this reality. 
 The fist assumption that I make is the absence of opportunistic behavior. I assume that 
the partners always behave according to the “contract.” For example, in consensus-based 
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structures, I assume that the partner that makes a proposal will never proceed with implementing 
this proposal if it is not approved by the other partner. I make this assumption to separate the 
effects of decision-making structures from those of ownership structures. Ownership structures 
matter precisely because they affect the incentives of the parties and the transaction costs. 
Ownership of assets and incentive alignment would not matter if opportunism-related transaction 
costs were zero (Foss, 1996a). However, coordinatio pr blems would still exist even in a world 
without opportunism (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). These coordination problems make decision-
making structures important.  
My second assumption is bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958). The existence of 
coordination problems is explained by bounded ration lity of decision makers. I assume that the 
decision makers in my models cannot evaluate all the possible decisions. The partners cannot 
simply identify the strategy that will yield the best performance and implement it. Thus they are 
forced to engage in local search (Cyert and March, 1963). The decision-making structure that 
they use will affect the strategy that they will be able to find and the performance of the 
combined venture. In addition to bounded rationality of their decision makers, firms are 
characterized by limited flexibility and imperfect dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Schreyogg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). Even if the 
decision makers were able to find the best-performing strategy, the firms may be unable to 
implement it because of limits to their flexibility. The effect of bounded rationality and limited 
flexibility are likely to be in the same direction, confining the firm to local search. 
 My third assumption is costless evaluation of proposals. I assume that the parties can 
easily and precisely evaluate the short-term effect of each new proposal on the performance of 
both parties and the combined venture. This assumption may seem unrealistic. In real life, firms 
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can rarely know the precise effect of a proposed decision on their performance. Effects of new 
decisions are often “contaminated” by effects of other decisions, changes in the environment, 
simultaneous actions of the partner, etc. However, I believe that this assumption is reasonable for 
the purpose of this study. It simplifies the model significantly while allowing for precise 
interpretation of its results. Managers of partnerig f rms often have a good idea about the likely 
short-term effect of the newly proposed decision. Their knowledge of the world often allows 
them to form good heuristics that guide the evaluation of proposals. In other words, the search 
process may be local but it is not necessarily blind. Finally, costless evaluation of proposals is an 
assumption built into much of the literature using formal computer modeling (e.g. Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006). Future researchers 
may want to look at the effect of relaxing this assumption. 
 Finally, I assume that the environment does not change. The mapping from the specific 
decision combinations to performance stays the same throughout the simulation. For example, if 
the parties were to find a certain combination of decisions A, then move to other combinations of 
decisions and then somehow come back to combination A, their performance during this second 
use of A would be the same as during their first use of A. While this assumption of a static 
environment may seem unrealistic, it does not mean th t the parties are only concerned with 
static efficiency. Their search for better performing strategies is driven by considerations of 
dynamic combining of the resources controlled by the two parties (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 
1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Exploitation of c mplementarities will likely require 
multiple adjustments from each party and search for the best ways to use the resources jointly. 
Thus, even in situations of relatively stable markets, decision-making structures that I study in 
this paper are likely to affect the performance of the combined venture. Again, future researchers 
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may want to study the effect of environmental dynamism on the relative performance of the 
various decision-making structures in future. 
 
Model specification 
In order to find answers to my research questions, I ran a series of computer simulations using a 
variant of the NK[C] modeling technique (Kauffman, 1993; McKelvey, 1999; Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004; Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). The choie of simulation as my research method 
was dictated by a few reasons. First, simulation-based research is a useful method of theory 
development (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007). It is especially useful when data 
collection is difficult, measurement of the key constructs is problematic, and there is little theory 
to generate empirically testable hypotheses. Second, simulation methods allow researchers to 
isolate the phenomenon of interest and study its effects without contamination from confounding 
factors. Finally, simulation results can be compared to prior empirical findings. If simulation 
results allow researchers to explain previously unexplained phenomena, their value is enhanced. 
My implementation of the NK[C] model is similar to he previous implementations in the 
literature with a few differences. I will describe my implementation of the model and highlight 
its differences from the previous implementations. 
 NK[C] models represent firms as vectors of interdependent decisions. This aspect of 
NK[C] models makes them especially suitable for studying interactions within and between 
firms, which is the main theme of my paper. K and C are the most important parameters of the 
model. Varying these parameters, I am able to model diff rences in the firms’ internal 
complexity and interdependence. Below is a description of all parameters of the model. 
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 Parameter N denotes the number of decisions facing the combined venture, which is 
sometimes referred to as the size of the firm. For example, if party 1 controls six decisions and 
party 2 controls six decisions, the size of the combined venture is therefore N = 12. The sizes of 
the two parties can be equal or non-equal. I modeled both equal and non-equal sizes to make sure 
that my results are robust. The overall size of the combined venture in the model (the value of N) 
is not very important. Even small values (for example, six – see Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) 
provide for meaningful variation and overall complexity of the model. Therefore, I chose to 
model the combined venture of size N = 12. This value of N is in line with the majority of 
research that has used NK[C] models in the past (e.g. Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Siggelkow 
and Rivkin, 2006; Ganco and Agarwal, 2009; Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011). Much 
greater values of N reduce variation in the performance of the decision-making structures and 
exponentially increase the computing time without providing substantial new insights. 
 The decisions that each party controls are assumed to be binary. This assumption can 
represent many aspects of reality in business and management. Managers often decide whether to 
switch suppliers or not; whether to introduce a new compensation scheme or leave the old 
scheme in place; whether to buy a new technology or develop it internally; whether to use the 
new technology at all or keep perfecting the old technology; etc. In addition, the binary nature of 
decisions does not limit the generalizability of results of NK[C] simulations (Levinthal, 1997).  
 Parameter K represents the internal complexity of the firm. Formally, K is the number of 
internal decisions of the firm that affect the payoff t  any particular decision. For example, if the 
payoff from every decision is totally independent of any other decision, the value of K is zero. I 
will call such a firm “simple.” When the value of K rises from zero, the firm becomes more 
complex. For example, when K equals two, each decision’s payoff depends not only on the 
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decision itself, but also on two other decisions that e focal firm has to make. The greatest 
possible value of K is N-1. When K = N-1, the payoff t  every decision depends on all the other 
decisions that the firm has to make and the complexity of the firm is the highest possible for a 
firm of this size. The intuition behind calling the firm “simple” or “complex” depending on the 
value of K is as follows. Low values of K mean that decisions of the firm are largely 
independent. When K equals zero, the firm’s managers can make each decision separately from 
the others because none of the decisions affect each other’s payoffs. The task of managing such a 
firm becomes relatively simple. When K is greater than zero, interactions among decisions are 
present. In order to make one optimal decision, managers have to optimize K other decisions 
simultaneously. The problem of finding optimal decisions quickly becomes mathematically 
intractable even at relatively small values of K (Rivkin, 2000). Thus, managers face much more 
complex problems when K increases. Decision making becomes the most complex when K 
reaches the maximum possible value of N-1. If one decision’s payoff depends on how the 
managers have resolved all other decisions, optimization of firm performance becomes virtually 
impossible.  
Figure 2 shows three examples of firms (size of the firm N = 4) at various levels of 
complexity. The X’s represent the interdependencies within the firm and the “minus” signs 
represent independent decisions. Each row represents one decision. The way to read these charts 
is as follows: go along a row from left to right. If there is an X in position [row, column], the 
payoff to the decision corresponding to the row depends on the decision corresponding to the 
column. By definition, the payoff to any decision alw ys depends on how the firm has resolved 
this decision. Thus, there will always be X’s on the main diagonal. 
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Figure 2: Examples of firms of various internal complexity. 
(a) Structure of the simplest possible firm (K = 0). There are four decisions in total (N = 4). Each 
decision’s payoff only depends on how the firm has resolved this decision but not on any other 
decisions. “X”: decisions are interdependent; “-“: decisions are independent. 
 
[ X   -   -   - ]  
[ -   X   -   - ] 
[ -   -   X   - ] 
[ -   -   -   X ] 
 
(b) Structure of a moderately complex firm (K = 1).There are four decisions in total (N = 4). 
Each decision’s payoff depends on how the firm has resolved this decision and one other 
decision. Remember that dependence is read horizontally (e.g. row 1: payoff to decision 1 
depends on itself and decision 3). This is one of many possible structures of a firm with N=4 and 
K=1. 
 
[ X  -   X  -  ]  
[ X  X  -   -  ] 
[ X   -   X  - ] 
[ -   X   -  X ] 
 
(c) Structure of a firm of the highest possible complexity (K = 3). There are four decisions in 
total (N = 4). Each decision’s payoff depends on how the firm has resolved this decision and all 
other decisions. 
 
[ X   X   X   X ]  
[ X   X   X   X ] 
[ X   X   X   X ] 
[ X   X   X   X ] 
 
 Considering the fact that there are two initially utonomous firms in my model, I use two 
values of K: K1 and K2. They correspond to internal complexities of party 1 and party 2, 
correspondingly. 
Parameter C represents the interdependence between he parties after they form a 
combined venture. Here I depart from the ways C was operationalized in Kauffman (1993) or 
Ganco and Agarwal (2009). In order to simplify the model and still capture all the possible 
variation, I let C denote the total number of interdependences of payoffs of decisions of one 
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party on the decisions of the other party. For example, if C equals two, it means that there are 
two different instances when a decision of partner 2 affects the payoff to some decision(s) of 
partner 1. To illustrate the parameter C, let us turn o Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: An example of a combined venture consisting of two interdependent parties. 
The size of the combined venture is N = 8. Each party is size N1 = N2 = 4. Each party is simple 
(K1 = K2 = 0) – there are no internal interactions of decision  within the parties. The value of C is 
two: there are two total cases of payoffs to decision  of each party being affected by decisions of 
the other party. The upper left quadrant in Figure 2 is party 1; the lower right quadrant in Figure 
2 is party 2. The upper right quadrant in Figure 2 is the dependence of payoffs to decisions of 
party 1 on decisions of party 2. The lower left quadrant in Figure 2 is the dependence of payoffs 
to decisions of party 2 on decisions of party 1. 
 
[ X  -  -  - | -  -  -  -  ] 
[ -  X  -  - | -  -  X - ] 
[ -  -  X  - | -  -  -  -  ] 
[ -  -  -  X | X -  -  - ] 
------------------------- 
[ -  -  -  -  | X  -  -  - ] 
[ -  -  -  -  | -  X  -  - ] 
[ - X X -  | -  -  X  - ] 
[ -  -  -  -  | -  -  -  X ] 
 
 
Figure 3 tells us that each party is simple (K1 = K2 = 0) as evidenced by X’s on the main 
diagonal only. Also, according to Figure 2, the payoff to decision 2 of party 1 depends on 
decision 3 of party 2; the payoff to decision 4 of party 1 depends on decision 1 of party 2. 
Finally, the payoff to decision 3 of party 2 depends on decisions 2 and 3 of party 1.  
 Figure 3 also shows us that the maximum value of parameter C is N1 times N2. In 
addition, there could be two different values of C: C1 and C2. C1 is the number of dependences of 
payoffs to decisions of party 1 on decisions of party 2 (upper right quadrant); C2 is the number of 
dependences of payoffs to decisions of party 2 on decisions of party 1 (lower left quadrant). In 
general, C1 and C2 do not have to be equal. If C1 is greater than C2, it means that the performance 
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of partner 1 is relatively more dependent on decision  of partner 2 than vice versa. The minimum 
possible value of C1 and C2 is zero, which would mean that one party’s performance is 
completely independent of anything that the other party does. I model the values of C1 and C2 
from 1 to N1 times N2. 
 In my simulations, I allowed each parameter (K1, 2, C1, C2, N1, and N2) to vary over the 
entire range of possible values. N1 and N2 vary from 2 to 10 (to exclude the trivial cases of a 
party the size of one). K1 (K2) varies from 0 to N1-1 (N2-1). C1 and C2 vary from 0 to N1*N2. My 
simulations thus cover all possible parameter combinations.  
 Now I would like to show how my parameters correspond to the research questions that I 
formulated earlier. In order to compare my results wi h those reported by Aggarwal, Siggelkow, 
and Singh (2011), I will be looking at the effect of the sum of C1 and C2 on the relative 
performance of the decision-making structures. Research Question 1 asked how the internal 
complexity of the parties affected the relative performance of the decision-making structures. To 
answer this question, I will be looking at the effect of the sum of K1 and K2 on the performance 
of decision-making structures (alone and in interaction with the sum of C1 and C2). Finally, 
Research Question 2 asked how the asymmetry of interdep ndence between the parties affects 
the relative performance of decision-making structures. To answer this question, I will be 
looking at the effect of the absolute difference between C1 and C2 on the relative performance of 
decision-making structures. 
 Table 3 provides a summary of the parameters of the model. 
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Table 3: Parameters of the model 
Parameter Meaning Assigned value 
or range of 
values 
Relevance to 
Research Question 
N The size of the combined 
venture 
12 n/a 
N1 The size of party 1 From 2 to 10 
(N1+N2=N) 
n/a 
N2 The size of party 2 From 10 to 2 
(N1+N2=N) 
n/a 
K1 The complexity of party 1 From 0 to N1-1 1 
K2 The complexity of party 2 From 0 to N2-1 1 
C1 Dependence of party 1 on 
party 2 
From 1 to N1*N2 2 
C2 Dependence of party 2 on 
party 1 
From 1 to N1*N2 2 
INTERDEPEND Total amount of 
interdependence between the 
parties 
From 0 to 
N1*N2*2 
 
COMPLEXITY The sum of complexities of the 
parties 
From 0 to K1+K2 1 
ASYMMETRY | C1 – C2 | From 0 to N1*N2 2 
 
Implementation 
 
Calculation of the performance of each party and the combined venture 
 
Following previous research (e.g. Levinthal, 1997, Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003), I 
calculated the performance of the parties and the combined venture as follows. At the start of 
each simulation run, I assigned a random value fromthe uniform distribution U[0,1] to each 
possible combination of decisions of the two parties. These values were stored in a large array. 
During simulation runs, the performance contribution of each decision was taken from this array. 
Consider the situation in Fig. 2. The payoff to decision 3 of party 2 depends on this decision as 
well as on decisions 2 and 3 of party 1. Given the binary nature of the decisions, there are 23 = 8 
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possible combinations of those decisions. Thus, the program accessed one of 8 randomly 
generated numbers depending on the values of the decisions. The resulting number was the 
payoff to decision 3 of party 2 considering the values of decisions 2 and 3 of party 1. Payoffs to 
all the decisions of each party were computed in this manner. The program always explicitly 
considered all interactions of decisions. The performance of each party was calculated as the 
simple average of payoffs to all decisions. Formally, Pj = [ΣijDij (D11, … DN1,1, D12, …, DN2, 
2)]/Nj, where Pj is the performance of party j; Dij is the payoff to decision i of party j considering 
its dependence on the decisions of both parties; Nj is the size of party j. 
 The performance of the combined venture was calculted similarly. The program 
calculated the performance of the combined venture as if it were one big firm. Mathematically, 
the performance of the combined venture was a weighted average of the performance values of 
the two partners considering their size. 
 
Search strategies 
 
When there are multiple interactions of decisions within and between the parties, the best-
performing combination of decisions is difficult to find (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000). Based on the notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1947), the parties were assumed to 
engage in local search (Cyert and March, 1963). Local search was implemented as varying one 
decision at a time. At each step of the search process, the parties took turns performing the 
following procedure. One party chose one decision at random and flipped this decision’s value 
(from zero to one or from one to zero). Then the program calculated the performance of each 
party and of the combined venture after this change. Depending on the decision-making structure 
adopted for this simulation run, the change was either accepted or rejected. In the latter case, the 
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change was reversed. The parties took turns in offering such proposals of change. After a number 
of steps, when the performance of the parties and the combined venture had stopped improving, 
the program recorded this achieved performance value.  
The program performed five simulation runs with each possible set of parameter values: 
one for each decision-making structure. In order to equalize the conditions for each decision-
making structure as much as possible, I did the following. For each new set of parameters, the 
program randomly generated a new starting combinatio  of decisions. All five decision-making 
structures started their search from this position. I did this to ensure that the only performance 
variation among the decision-making structures was attributable to the different ways they 
evaluated proposals. The total number of simulation runs with all parameter value combinations 
was over 253 thousand. 
 
Specification of decision-making structures 
 
I followed Table 2 in implementing the decision-making structures. Each decision-making 
structure was implemented as a set of rules that specified how the decision was allowed to affect 
the performance of the parties and the combined ventur .  
In the decentralized decision-making structure, the parties took turns offering proposals. 
A proposed change was accepted if it improved the performance of the proposing party without 
regard to its effect on the performance of the other party.  
In consensus-based decision-making structures, the parties took turns offering proposals. 
A proposed change was accepted if it improved the performance of the proposing party and 
either (1) did not decrease the performance of the o r party, or (2) did not decrease the 
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performance of the combined venture. Thus, I implemented two versions of consensus-based 
decision-making structures. I called variant (1) “rest ictive structure” because it placed the most 
severe restrictions on the actions of the parties. I called variant (2) “consensus structure” because 
it allowed the parties more latitude than the restrictive structure but still less than the 
decentralized structure. 
In the divisional decision-making structure, the parties took turns offering proposals. A 
proposed change was accepted if it improved the performance of the combined venture.  
Finally, in the centralized decision-making structure, the combined venture offered 
proposals. A proposal was accepted if it improved the performance of the combined venture. 
 
Specification of the regression model 
 
In order to find the answers to my research question , I performed linear regression analysis of 
the data generated by my program. The dependent variable, DIFF_PERFORM was the difference 
in performance between two specific decision-making structures (e.g. the difference in 
performance between centralized and decentralized decision-making structures). The dependent 
variable was calculated for each possible pair of decision-making structures. The independent 
variables were: (1) INTERDEPEND: the sum of interdependence values of the two parties 
(C1+C2); (2) COMPLEXITY: the sum of complexity values of the two parties (K1+K2); (3) 
INTERACTION: the product of parameters (1) and (2) representing their interaction effect; (4) 
ASYMMETRY: the absolute difference between the interdependence values of the two parties 
(abs(C1-C2)). I also included SIZE_DIFF as a control variable: the absolute difference in size 
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between the two parties (abs(N1- 2)). Finally, I tested for possible non-linear effects of party 
complexity. I included the variable COMPLEXITY_SQUARED in the regression model. 
 The formal specification of the model is as follows: 
 DIFF_PERFORM = b0 + b1*INTERDEPEND + b2*COMPLEXITY + 
b3*INTERACTION_INTERDEPENT_COMPLEXITY + b4*ASYMMETRY + b5*SIZE_DIFF 
+b6*COMPLEXITY_SQUARED + error 
 In order to avoid multicollinearity problems caused by introducing a product of two 
independent variables, I orthogonalized it by regressing the product on both terms and storing the 
residuals. These residuals were used as the new value of the product term. I also orthogonalized 
the COMPLEXITY_SQUARED term this way. However, it made interpretation of the results 
difficult. This is why I report the results for COMPLEXITY_SQUARED in the original (non-
orthogonalized) metric and show the non-linear effect. 
 
RESULTS 
 
In order to illustrate the answers to the research questions, I will use the difference in 
performance between centralized and decentralized decision-making structures (see Table 3). I 
will provide the similar detailed data for other dependent variables in the appendix. 
In order to test the conceptualizing in Nickerson and Zenger (2004) and compare my results to 
those reported in Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011), I would like to discuss the effect of 
interdependence between the parties on the relative performance of the centralized structure. The 
coefficient for INTERDEPEND in Table 3 is positive and significant (B = 0.799, p < 0.001). It 
means that combined ventures characterized by significa t interdependence between the parties 
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benefit more from centralization of decision making than combined venture characterized by low 
interdependence between the parties. This result suggests that highly interdependent parties may 
see additional benefits to centralization of decision making even when opportunism is not an 
issue. This result is similar to the findings of Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011). 
 
Question 1: How does the internal complexity of the parties affect the need to centralize 
decision making in a combined venture? 
Part of the answer to this question is provided by the coefficient for the variable COMPLEXITY. 
Its value is negative and significant (B = -3.586, p < 0.001). It means that parties with higher 
internal complexity experience lower benefits from centralization of decision making regarding 
the joint use of their resources compared to parties with low internal complexity. The other part 
of the answer is provided by the coefficients for the variable 
INTERACTION_COMPLEXITY_INTERDEPENDENCE. It is negative and significant (B =     
-0.225, p < 0.001). It means that the even though hi interdependence between the two parties 
has a positive effect on the benefits of centralization, its effect is weakened when the two parties 
are internally complex. 
 To facilitate interpretation of the interaction betw en internal complexity of the parties 
and interdependence between the parties, I have provided the following graph (Fig. 4): 
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Figure 4: Interaction between firm complexity and interdependence between the parties. 
The dependent variable is the performance difference between centralized and decentralized 
decision-making structures. The independent variable is the combined degree of interdependence 
between the parties. The moderator is the combined complexity of the parties. 
 
 
 
We can see that parties of low internal complexity gain much more from centralization when 
they are highly interdependent. This gain greatly diminishes when the parties are of high internal 
complexity. 
 In order to investigate a possible nonlinear or non-monotonic effect of internal 
complexity, I included the squared complexity term in the regression equation. We can see that 
the coefficient for the squared term is positive and significant (0.818, p < 0.001). In order to 
facilitate interpretation of the quadratic term, I have drawn the following graph: 
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Figure 5 
The difference in performance between centralized and decentralized decision-making structures 
as a function of the combined complexity of the parties. 
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Thus, we can see that combined internal complexity has a negative effect on the performance 
advantage of the centralized decision-making structu e. This effect is most pronounced at 6 and 7 
and actually starts to diminish at higher values of combined internal complexity.  
 In order to explain the effect of internal complexity of the parties on the benefits of 
centralization, let us first consider the case of simple parties with no internal interactions of 
decisions and activities. If such two parties are significantly interdependent, each of them may 
impose potentially significant externalities on each other under decentralized decision making. 
One change in the strategy of Party 1 may affect the payoffs to many or all decisions of Party 2. 
However, since each party engages in local search by altering one decision at a time, it has only a 
limited ability to correct the negative consequences of the other party’s strategizing. As a result, 
simple parties have the greatest need to centralize decision making when they are significantly 
interdependent. 
When each party is moderately complex, each decision by this party may affect the 
performance of some other decisions. In general, this performance effect may be negative when 
the party engages in local search. However, if the performance of one party has just been 
negatively affected by the other party, changing one decision may in fact positively affect the 
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performance contributions of some other decisions that have been affected by the previous move 
by the other party. As a result, parties of moderate complexity will experience smaller 
performance benefits from centralizing their decision making. 
Why does this effect level off and even reverse at high complexities of the parties? 
Highly complex parties experience the greatest problems with local search due to the presence of 
multiple simultaneous interactions of activities and decisions (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). In a 
very complex firm, changing one decision affects the payoffs to nearly all other decisions. As a 
result, highly complex firms may “overcompensate” when trying to respond to externalities 
imposed by the other party. For example, suppose that Party 1 has affected payoffs to two 
decisions of Party 2. In an attempt to correct the ext rnal shock to its performance, Party 2 tries 
to change one decision of its own. However, this change in one decision affects payoffs to most 
other decisions of Party 2. As a result, the performance effect of the change may be negligible or 
even negative for Party 2. Thus, highly complex parties may need more centralization compared 
to firms of moderate complexity. 
 
Question 2: How does the degree of asymmetry in interdependence between the parties affect 
the need to centralize decision making in a combined venture? 
The answer to this question is provided by the coeffici nt for the variable ASYMMETRY. It is 
negative and significant (B = -0.704, p < 0.001). It means that combined ventures characterized 
by high asymmetry of interdependence benefit less from centralization than combined ventures 
in which the two parties are symmetrically interdependent. This result is explained by the 
presence of a “leader-follower” effect. Suppose that e venture has chosen the decentralized 
decision-making structure. It means that each party is free to do anything. When the less 
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dependent party takes an action, it is likely to affect the performance of the more dependent 
party. The more dependent party responds by taking an action of its own. However, the less 
dependent party is less likely to “feel” the effect of its party’s action and less likely to respond. 
Thus, the less dependent party plays the role of a leader while the more dependent party plays the 
role of a follower. Successful adaptation and search in this case happen almost automatically, 
without much need for centralized decision making.  
Table 4: Difference in performance of centralized and decentralized decision-making 
structures as a function of independent variables. 
 
Independent variables Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 31.263 .516  55.219 .000 
INTERDEPEND .799 .010 .160 79.687 .000 
COMPLEXITY -3.586 .053 -.131 -68.154 .000 
ASYMMETRY -.704 .017 -.079 -40.439 .000 
INTERACTION_INTERDEPEND 
_COMPLEXITY 
-.225 .004 -.114 -59.445 .000 
DIFF_SIZE .349 .062 .011 5.591 .000 
COMPLEXITY_SQUARED .818 .019 .082 42.763 .000 
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DISCUSSION 
 
One of the contributions of this paper is to extend the findings of Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and 
Singh (2011). I would like to start the discussion with explaining their main findings and relating 
their results to what I did. Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011) used a similar computer 
simulation methodology to study the relationship between interdependence and optimal 
governance mode choice. The way they modeled an allia ce was as follows: they divided each 
firm into the “alliance” part (the part of the firm that is directly involved in an alliance) and the 
“non-alliance” part (the part of the firm not directly involved in an alliance). They also modeled 
firms that did not separate the “alliance” parts from the rest of the firms’ operations as well as 
completely centralized entities representing two merged firms. The question that they 
investigated was the performance implications of various governance modes (ranging from no 
coordination to complete centralization) depending o  the degree of interdependence between 
the two parties. The findings reported in Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and Singh (2011) indicate that 
more interdependence between the parties increased the benefits of more centralized governance. 
However, their study made two important assumptions: (1) the firms are symmetrically 
interdependent and their “alliance parts” are of equal size; (2) the firms have equal internal 
complexity (maximum possible for the firms of a given size). I believe that these assumptions are 
not merely technical details but represent important structural characteristics of the firms and the 
resulting combined venture. Therefore, the motivation behind this study was to tease out the 
effects of asymmetric interdependence and internal complexity on the optimal choice of a 
decision-making structure in the absence of opportunism.   
My computer simulations show that centralization of decision-making tends to bring 
positive performance benefits when there is higher int rdependence between the two parties. 
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However, the size of these benefits depends on the complexity of the parties. When the parties 
are internally complex, they benefit less from centralization compared to internally simple 
parties. While high interdependence between the parties generally has a positive effect on the 
performance advantage of centralized decision-making structures, its effect is diminished by 
increased asymmetry of interdependence. These results were obtained by running relatively 
simple models that made certain assumptions. Now I would like to discuss the likely effects of 
relaxing some of those assumptions. 
 A key assumption that I made is the absence of opportunism. I made this assumption in 
order to isolate the effects of interdependence and complexity on the optimal choice of a 
decision-making structure. My results do not say anythi g about the optimal ownership 
structures in which those decision-making structures should be organized. If opportunism-related 
transaction costs are zero, the partners can set up any decision-making structure under any 
ownership structure. For example, firms contracting in the market could set up a centralized 
decision-making structure, and firms that decided to merge could use a fully decentralized 
decision-making structure. The choice of an optimal decision-making structure would become 
completely independent from the choice of an optimal ownership structure. In fact, the choice of 
an ownership mode would not matter at all if there were no opportunism-related transaction costs 
(Foss, 1996a). However, the choice of a decision-making structure would still be important even 
in the absence of opportunism, as my simulations show. Thus, my results formally demonstrate 
that the study of governance mode choice benefits from integrating ideas from knowledge-based 
theories (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1992; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Madhok, 1996, 2002) with 
ideas from organizational economics theories. I would like to stress that my results do not 
disconfirm the arguments and findings of either theoretical perspective. Knowledge-based 
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theories emphasize the role of the decision-making structure in the absence of opportunism while 
organizational economics theories emphasize the role of ownership structures and formal 
contracts in mitigating transaction costs that arise from opportunism. My findings contribute to 
the emerging integration of knowledge-based and organizational economics theories on the 
boundary of the firm. A combination of the two theor tical perspectives can potentially provide a 
fuller understanding of the choice among different governance modes. 
 
Role of Opportunism 
 
What happens if I relax the assumption of zero opportunism? Implementing centralized decision-
making structures becomes more costly if the assets ar  owned separately. Without opportunism, 
the parties could agree to maximize the performance of the combined venture and then divide the 
profits equitably. However, if one party can opportunistically appropriate most of the benefits 
from the combined venture, the other party will be wary of entering such a combined venture. It 
will likely demand additional safeguards in the form of equity investments that align their 
interests and/or costly monitoring mechanisms. In the extreme cases, merging the assets of the 
two partners may be the only way to implement a centralized decision-making structure. The two 
parties may attempt to implement a centralized decision-making structure in a contract-based 
alliance as well. However, they would have to set up a costly system of monitoring which is also 
likely to be highly imperfect. It may be less costly for the two partners to arrange for some form 
of common ownership of assets (e.g. an equity jointve ure) to implement a joint decision-
making structure. 
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 Thus, in real life, the choice of a decision-making structure will be related to the choice 
of an ownership structure. For example, if asset spcificity is high, the parties are more likely to 
merge or use significant equity investments (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1991). This 
centralization of asset ownership may allow them to implement a more centralized decision-
making structure. We have seen that more centralized decision-making structures tend to 
outperform less centralized decision-making structures if the parties are significantly 
interdependent. It may make sense for the parties to centralize decision making as well. Thus, we 
would expect to see more centralized decision-making structures in combined ventures 
characterized by significant equity investments. On the other hand, the optimal decision-making 
structure choice might drive the choice of an ownership structure. If the task of combining the 
parties’ resources calls for highly centralized decision making, they may want to merge or form 
an equity joint venture because such an ownership choice is likely to economize on transaction 
costs. The goal of centralization of decision making is to create value for the combined venture, 
not for either individual party. Centralized ownership of assets largely eliminates private 
interests and subjugates the individual players to the interests of the combined venture. 
Therefore, the need to choose a more centralized decision-making structure may drive common 
ownership of assets.  
 My findings formally confirm some theoretical insights of Nickerson and Zenger (2004). 
In particular, I found that when interdependence betwe n the parties is low (corresponding to 
Nickerson and Zenger’s “decomposable problem”), decentralized decision-making structures 
work well. This result is in line with Nickerson and Zenger’s prediction that decomposable 
problems can be solved in market-like structures. However, when interdependence between the 
partners increases, my results depart from those predicted by Nickerson and Zenger. They 
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predicted that “nearly decomposable problems” (corresponding to moderate degrees of 
interdependence between the partners in my terminology) would lead to authority-based 
hierarchy while “nondecomposable problems” (corresponding to high degrees of 
interdependence between the partners in my terminology) would lead to consensus-based 
hierarchy. My results show that when interdependence between the parties is high, centralized 
decision-making structures outperform consensus-based decision-making structures. Part of the 
reason why my results diverge from Nickerson and Zenger’s (2004) predictions is that I studied 
“pure” decision-making structures while Nickerson and Zenger conceptualized on the 
governance form in general (thus subsuming both the decision-making structure and the 
ownership structure). Their conceptualization focuses on the negative consequences from 
opportunistic behavior in highly interdependent relationships, while my conceptualization takes 
into account both the damages and opportunities created by the “external” shocks from the 
actions of the two parties in the absence of opportunism.   
 It might be tempting to argue that Nickerson and Zenger’s (2004) “nondecomposable 
problem” refers to both the high interdependence betwe n the partners and the high internal 
partner complexity. If that is the case, my results contradict Nickerson and Zenger’s predictions. 
I find that greater internal complexity of the partners actually decreases the benefits of 
centralization. Moreover, it decreases the positive eff ct of greater interdependence on the 
benefits of centralization. I suggest that interdependence between the parties alone is a better fit 
to Nickerson and Zenger’s concept of decomposability. When the two parties contemplate the 
choice of the governance form, they do not usually consider changes to their internal governance 
forms that are already in use. The governance form choice usually refers to the choice of a 
decision-making structure and ownership structure that will govern the relationship between the 
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parties. Therefore, a party’s internal complexity is conceptually distinct from “decomposability” 
that Nickerson and Zenger (2004) used as a predictor of governance choice. However, I found 
that internal complexity of the parties affects the benefits of centralization and thereby affects the 
optimal governance mode choice. 
 Another result of my simulations has not been predict  before. I found that asymmetry 
of interdependence actually decreases benefits of centralization of decision-making. This may 
seem counterintuitive because usually asymmetric interdependence is seen as a condition for 
high transaction costs and thus a factor that should increase centralization. This discrepancy 
between my findings and the usual predictions is easily explained. As I have argued earlier, 
asymmetric interdependence between the partners give rise to the “leader-follower” effect. This 
means that coordination between the asymmetrically dependent parties happens almost 
automatically without the need for centralized decision making. Also, I use the term 
“dependence” differently from its conventional meaning. “Dependence” is often used to mean 
“resource dependence” (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), “supply chain dependence” (Harland, 1996), 
or, in an extended sense, dependence of the party th t makes a transaction-specific investment on 
the other party’s honesty (Williamson, 1985). My use of the term “dependence” refers to the 
dependence of performance of one party on the actions of the other party. This kind of 
dependence includes, but is not limited to, resource dependence, supply chain dependence, or 
dependence due to transaction-specific investments. For example, R&D alliances, in which the 
parties pool resources to create a new product or technology, are usually characterized by 
reciprocal interdependence (Gulati and Singh, 1998). This interdependence is a result of complex 
complementarities between the resources and activities of the parties. However, it does not 
necessarily give rise to high transaction costs in W lliamsonian sense. I have found that such 
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interdependence positively affects centralization of decision making, but only when the parties 
are relatively symmetrically dependent on each other. With an increase in the asymmetry of 
interdependence, the benefits of centralization diminish. 
 When transaction costs are positive and significant, the asymmetry of interdependence 
may contribute to the increase of transaction costs. This is particularly likely when one party can 
use its lower dependence to threaten actions that will hurt the other party’s performance. Thus, 
predictions based on asymmetry of interdependence are not as straightforward. While asymmetry 
will decrease benefits to centralization of decision making, it may increase benefits to 
centralization of asset ownership. Since an asset ownership structure needs to be compatible with 
the decision-making structure, the optimal governance mode structure will depend on the overall 
risk of opportunism as well. Under low risk of opportunism, asymmetry of interdependence is 
likely to have a negative effect on centralization of governance. Under high risk of opportunism, 
asymmetry of interdependence is likely to have a positive effect on centralization of governance. 
 My contribution in this essay is the simultaneous consideration of inter-party dependence 
and intra-party complexity as determinants of the optimal decision-making structure. I would 
like to sum up the predictions of my models in Table 5. For convenience, I compare my results 
with those predicted by Nickerson and Zenger (2004). 
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Table 5: My results compared to theoretical predictions by Nickerson & Zenger (2004) 
Factor Prediction by 
Nickerson and Zenger 
(2004) 
Prediction of my 
model without 
transaction costs 
Prediction of my model 
with transaction costs 
The degree of 
interdependence 
between the 
parties (defined 
as dependence of 
performance of 
one party on the 
actions of the 
other party) 
Low interdependence: 
market governance. 
Medium 
interdependence: 
authority-based 
hierarchy. 
High interdependence: 
consensus-based 
hierarchy 
Higher 
interdependence 
increases benefits of 
centralized decision 
making. 
Higher interdependence 
increases the probability 
of using more centralized 
governance modes (e.g. 
equity joint ventures or 
mergers) 
Internal 
complexity of 
the parties 
No prediction Higher internal 
complexity of the 
parties (1) decreases 
benefits of 
centralized decision 
making; (2) decreases 
the positive effect of 
interdependence on 
benefits of 
centralization. 
More internally complex 
parties will be more likely 
to use decentralized 
governance modes (e.g. 
market contracting or non-
equity alliances). 
Asymmetry of 
interdependence 
between the 
parties 
No prediction Higher asymmetry of 
interdependence 
between the parties 
decreases the benefits 
of centralized 
decision making. 
When opportunism threat 
is low, asymmetric 
interdependence will be 
related to less centralized 
governance (e.g. market 
contracting or non-equity 
alliances). When 
opportunism threat is high, 
asymmetric 
interdependence will be 
related to more centralized 
governance (e.g. equity 
joint ventures or mergers). 
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Relevance to Existing Empirical Work 
 
Finally, I would like to discuss how my results help xplain empirical phenomena. According to 
Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham (2007), using simulation results to “predict” well-known 
empirical findings is a standard way of validating simulation research in economics. The key 
issue here is whether the simulation offers any newtheoretical insight to explain the well-known 
empirical results.  
As an example, I will use some of the findings by Villalonga and McGahan (2005) on the 
relation between the degree of diversification and the preference of acquisitions over alliances. 
Villalonga and McGahan (2005) found that highly diversified firms were much more likely to 
use acquisitions than alliances. They explained this finding by the fact that highly diversified 
firms were likely to have used acquisitions to become diversified. As a result, these firms are 
more likely to use acquisitions again because they have accumulated acquisition experience and 
may have build up capabilities to acquire and successfully integrate other firms (Laamanen and 
Keil, 2008; Zollo and Singh, 2004). This line of reasoning suggests that controlling for the 
previous acquisition experience should have eliminated or at least greatly reduced the effect of 
diversification on the preference for acquisitions. However, this was not the case: the effect of 
diversification on the preference for acquisitions a d other centralized governance forms remains 
highly significant (e.g. Villalonga and McGahan (2005), Table 6 on p. 1199: coefficients for 
diversification are positive and highly significant with t-values around 24 even when controlling 
for the previous acquisition experience). 
How can my findings explain the phenomenon reported by Villalonga and McGahan 
(2005)? The way Villalonga and McGahan (2005) operation lized diversification was the 
“[n]umber of segments in different SIC codes reported by the focal firm.” (p. 1197). Their 
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measure was in effect capturing lack of relatedness of diversification: if one firm is active in 
many different SIC codes, it is not likely to be using a related diversification strategy. Using my 
terminology, a firm that is highly diversified in unrelated ways is a firm with relatively few 
internal interactions. Divisions of such a firm are lik ly to operate as independent units, and the 
need for coordination among them is likely to be low. On the other hand, a firm that is 
diversified in related ways will need more coordination because its units will exhibit resource 
complementarity. Thus, if we compare firms of equal size, relatedly-diversified firms will have 
more internal interactions among their divisions than firms using unrelated diversification. 
My findings predict that firms with relatively many internal interactions of resources will 
be less likely to use centralization than firms with relatively few internal interactions of 
resources. This is exactly what Villalonga and McGahan (2005) reported. My predictions of this 
effect are not based on the previous acquisition experience of the firm. Thus, my findings help 
predict and explain a real-world empirical phenomenon that was not adequately explained 
before. 
 
Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 
The main limitation of my study relates to the chosen method of research. Computer simulations 
are based upon abstract models that simplify the reality. While I have explained that my model is 
an acceptable approximation of reality for the purpose of my study, it is nevertheless quite 
simple. The only factor that determined performance of combined ventures in my study was the 
specific combination of decisions that the combined v nture was able to find. This is a common 
weakness of all studies that use NK[C] modeling. In reality, the performance of combined 
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ventures is determined by many other factors as well, inc uding resource characteristics (Das and 
Teng, 2000), interpersonal dynamics (de Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004), the level of interpartner 
trust (Gulati, 1995; Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven, 2006), experience with the chosen 
governance form (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), and many others. Choosing decision making 
as the only factor affecting the performance of the combined venture was necessary to isolate the 
effects of decision-making structures. Investigating he choice of decision-making structures in 
the context of other factors that affect combined vntures is the next step in this area of research. 
 The present study is most applicable to combined ventures in which significant learning 
and adaptation takes place. Thus, for example, it is less applicable to supply agreements that 
involve the exchange of a clearly defined product or service for a predetermined payment. The 
results of this study are most applicable to R&D alliances, joint ventures that are formed to 
penetrate new markets, mergers that hope to exploit potential synergies of resources and 
capabilities, and other similar combined ventures. One of the main assumptions that I made in 
this paper is bounded rationality which does not all w managers to write complete contracts. The 
effects of bounded rationality will be much more sever  in the case of an R&D alliance than in 
the case of a supply agreement. By definition, R&D alliances engage in exploration of new, 
previously undiscovered opportunities. Such alliances are likely to be characterized by 
significant ambiguity and lack of ex ante knowledge about the course of action that will bring the 
desired benefits. Similarly, the ways to integrate two firms’ resources into one company are 
difficult to predict in advance. Thus, these combined ventures will likely result in lengthy and 
complicated search and adaptation with unpredictable results. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The present paper was motivated to study the effects of interfirm dependence and intrafirm 
complexity on the optimal choice of decision-making structure in the absence of opportunism, I 
found that the internal complexity of the parties and the degree and asymmetry of 
interdependence between the parties affect the performance benefits of centralization of decision 
making. In particular, I found that more centralization is optimal when there is significant 
interdependence between the parties. However, performance benefits of centralization are more 
limited when this interdependence between the parties is asymmetrical or when the parties are 
internally complex. My study is based on formal computer simulations. Its validity is enhanced 
by the fact that it predicts and explains the relationship between broad diversification and tighter 
governance structures. This study also contributes to the theory of the firm by showing how 
interdependence between the two initially autonomous firms affects centralization of decision 
making even in the absence of opportunism. 
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Essay 3: Interdependence, coordination, and firm performance 
in alliances: Insights from a simulation study 
 
Introduction 
 
Firms that enter a strategic alliance5 an often choose how much they will coordinate their 
actions. Coordination can bring benefits such as better use of the partners’ resources and 
capabilities and lower negative externalities (damage to each other’s performance) that the 
partners might impose on each other. Closer coordinatio  may also mean that one firm will have 
to forego some opportunities to improve its performance at the expense of its partner’s 
performance. On the other hand, if the partners act largely independently and do not coordinate 
their actions much, they may be less likely to find a well-performing joint strategy and utilize 
their combined resources to the fullest. Lack of coordination may also result in significant 
negative externalities that the partners will impose n each other. Meanwhile, each firm will be 
relatively free to pursue any activities without being constrained by having to coordinate them 
with its partner or seek its partner’s approval. This independence in decision making may result 
in better use of individual opportunities that the firm encounters. Therefore, alliance partners 
face tradeoffs when they decide on the amount and nture of coordination of their actions. 
 When will more coordination or more independent action be beneficial to a specific firm 
in an alliance? This question is often studied from the point of view of the whole alliance (e.g. 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002; Gerwin, 2004; Aggarwal, 
                                                          
5 I chose to talk about alliances in Essay 3, not abut combined ventures for the following reason. Essay 3 is about 
benefits at the level of individual parties while Essay 2 (where I used the term “combined ventures”) is about 
benefits at the aggregate level. Arguably, parties in an alliance will be more interested in individual-level benefits 
than divisions in a single firm. This is why Essay 3 is most applicable to alliances. It may also be applicable to 
divisions in a single firm if the divisional managers’ compensation is based on divisional performance. 
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Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011). More coordination is usually beneficial to the alliance as a whole 
because it allows for better use of the partners’ re ources and capabilities (Grant, 1991; Gulati, 
1999) and greater value creation at the alliance lev l. More coordination may not be beneficial to 
an individual partner if this partner has to bear significant one-sided costs of coordination. 
Existing research does not say much about when coordination or independent action in alliances 
will be beneficial to a specific partner. Studying performance implications of coordination at the 
alliance level is important; however, managers of individual firms will also want to know the 
relative benefits of coordinated decision making vs. independent decision making for their firms. 
 Coordination in alliances is necessary because of interdependence of the partners. 
Interdependence is defined here as a situation when on  partner’s actions may affect the other 
partner’s performance and vice versa. Intuitively, it seems clear that an alliance with more 
interdependence between the partners will require more centralized coordination, ceteris paribus 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011). It is not as clear what 
conditions lead to greater benefits for the specific partner. Interdependence in alliances is not 
always symmetric. Does it benefit the focal firm to ally with a partner that is greatly dependent 
on the focal firm? Does the chosen mode of coordinatio  between the partners affect the 
relationship? Existing theories do not provide answer  to these questions. 
 This paper is an attempt to fill this theoretical void. Using agent-based simulations, I 
study an alliance between two interdependent firms. I am not concerned with why the firms enter 
the alliance and become interdependent. I treat interdependence as a given and study the process 
of interaction and search for strategies between two interdependent partners. I assume that the 
partners are boundedly rational (March and Simon, 1958) and engage in local search (Cyert and 
March, 1963) for a relatively long period of time in order to find a well-performing joint 
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strategy. I model various decision-making structures (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988) as ways to 
coordinate the actions of the two partners. In this paper, a decision-making structure is defined as 
a set of rules that determine (1) who makes proposals and (2) the criteria to evaluate those 
proposals. The parameters of the model are the degree of dependence of the partners on each 
other and the various levels of internal partner complexity (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; 
Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). Internal complexity of a firm is defined as the number of interactions 
of its resources and activities. As stated earlier, pa tner dependence on each other refers to the 
extent to which their actions affect each other’s performance. Partner complexity accounts for 
different possible internal structures of the partners. The dependent variable of the model is the 
performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  dependence on the focal firm and the 
partner’s internal complexity. The decision-making structure (DMS) is assumed to be a policy 
choice of the managers of the allying firms. 
 The findings show that the focal firm’s performance under every DMS is negatively 
affected by the greater dependence of the partner on the focal firm. The effect of partner internal 
complexity on the performance of the focal firm is more complicated and depends on the chosen 
DMS. Finally, the effect of the DMS choice on the focal firm’s performance depends on the 
structure of interdependence in the alliance and the internal complexities of the partners. In 
general, centralized decision making is the most beneficial for the focal firm; however, in some 
cases, it results in the worst performance of the focal firm. 
Overall, the results suggest that there is a group of factors affecting firm performance in 
alliances that have not been studied before. These factors are rooted in the process of 
collaboration and search for a well-performing joint strategy under conditions of 
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interdependence. The results of this study are empirically testable and can be used as a first step 
in the program of research that will investigate th effects of those factors. 
 
Dependence and interdependence in alliances 
 
Many alliances are characterized by significant interdependence between the partners. Before 
proceeding with the analysis of performance implications of coordination, I would like to 
consider the concept of dependence and interdependence in greater detail.  
According to Emerson (1962, p. 32), “A depends upon B if he aspires to goals or 
gratifications whose achievement is facilitated by appropriate actions on B's part.” This 
definition makes three important assumptions: (1) A’s goals are clear; (2) it is clear what actions 
B needs to take in order to facilitate or hinder the achievement of A’s goals; (3) B can hurt A’s 
performance without hurting its own performance. For example, if A needs a resource that B has 
and if this resource is difficult to substitute or obtain elsewhere, A will depend on B in the 
Emersonian sense. If B withholds the resource from A, it will complicate A’s achievement of its 
goals. If B cannot sell the resource to anyone else but A, the situation becomes one of mutual 
dependence and the power differential diminishes or disappears. 
 The situation with resource dependence described aove is an example of relatively 
simple dependence. Many modern alliances are much more complex. For example, the partners 
may form an alliance to develop a new product or technology. Such alliances are often 
characterized by significant reciprocal interdependence between the partners (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). This interdependence means that each partner’s actions may affect the other partner’s 
immediate and or/long-term performance. However, this performance effect may be positive or 
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negative, so there is no clear-cut power relationship even if this interdependence is asymmetric. 
Each partner will have certain goals whose achievemnt ay be facilitated by some actions of 
the other partner. It is usually unclear at the beginning precisely what actions need to be taken by 
each partner to achieve those goals. Emersonian power-dependence relationships can only exist 
when one partner knows what it needs to do to hurt t e other partner without hurting itself as 
much in the process. Modern technologies and busines  systems are often very complex, with 
many interacting resources, activities, and decisions needed to achieve the goals of the alliance 
and of each partner. The complexity of the interactions in many alliances may present many 
situations in which it is unclear what one partner eds to do to improve or damage the 
performance of the other partner. While the partners may be interdependent, they may not have 
clearly defined means to improve or damage each other’s performance. Thus, power differentials 
may not exist even when the alliance is characterized by asymmetric interdependence. 
 An example of different approaches to interdependence is provided by the U.S. auto 
manufacturers vs. Toyota. Traditionally, U.S. auto manufacturers have used many suppliers 
while maintaining low dependence on any one of them. The goal of such an arrangement was to 
play the suppliers against one another to squeeze profits from them. Since the U.S. auto 
manufacturers have low dependence on any one supplier, they can easily switch suppliers. 
Toyota, on the other hand, has traditionally worked with just a few suppliers. As a result, Toyota 
is much more dependent on its suppliers. Nevertheless, Toyota’s relationships with its suppliers 
are quite successful. Working more closely with its suppliers, Toyota is better positioned to 
address quality issues and make sure that the suppliers have the right parts necessary for 
Toyota’s new vehicles. 
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Individual costs and benefits 
 
An alliance in which the partners are strongly interdependent is likely to be characterized by 
significant coordination needs (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). When the partners have to 
coordinate their actions, each one of them may incur individual costs or enjoy individual 
benefits. These costs and benefits are side-effects of oordination under interdependence. They 
are conceptually different from private benefits (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). Private 
benefits exist when one firm picks up knowledge andskills from its partner and applies them to 
activities unrelated to the alliance. Individual costs and benefits of coordination occur when one 
partner’s actions affect the other’s performance or when one partner has to forego some 
opportunities because the other partner vetoes someof its proposals.  
While it is intuitively clear how such individual costs and benefits may occur, it is more 
difficult to predict based on extant theories when they will be positive or negative. Existing 
theories of alliances are silent about the effects of asymmetric interdependence without power 
differentials on the performance of the focal firm. Such theories as resource dependence theory 
(RDT; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) and transaction cost economics 
(TCE; Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1988) do not apply to cases when there are no power 
differentials or opportunism. As has been argued before, asymmetric interdependence may not 
necessarily entail power differentials; besides, not all alliances are characterized by deliberate 
use of power differentials or opportunism. The asymmetric gains to alliance partners caused by 
asymmetries in dependence or internal complexity maexist independently of the problems of 
resource dependence or transaction costs. The causeof a ymmetric gains studied in this paper is 
bounded rationality of the decision makers (March & Simon, 1958). Trust and relational 
governance may remedy some problems of resource depen nce and transaction costs but not the 
88 
 
coordination problems caused by bounded rationality of he decision makers and great 
complexity of modern business systems and technology. 
 
Performance effects of partner complexity 
 
Another factor that may affect the performance of the focal firm in an alliance is the internal 
complexity of its partner. The idea of firm complexity was developed by Herbert Simon (1962). 
Simon suggested that the presence of multiple interac ions of resources and activities within the 
firm makes the problem of managing this firm complicated. Modifying one resource or activity 
may affect many other resources or activities, which would in turn necessitate their adjustment. 
A firm with multiple interactions among its resources and activities is called complex. A firm of 
the same size with few interactions among its resources and activities is called simple.  
The importance of partner complexity for the performance of the focal firm in an alliance 
stems from the following condition. Firms participating in an alliance may be unable to separate 
their “alliance” parts from the rest of their operations. Such separation was suggested by Hennart 
(2006) as a way to make an alliance more stable and manageable6. The likelihood of a successful 
separation diminishes with the growing complexity of the firm. If a firm’s resources and 
activities interact densely to create value, its “alliance” part may be connected to the rest of the 
firm with many links. Breaking these links would beimpossible without severely impairing the 
firm’s capabilities (Collis, 1994). An action or decision of the focal firm may affect only a small 
part of the activities within its partner. If these activities are densely interconnected with the rest 
                                                          
6 It could be argued that firm A could simply sell its assets to firm B if those assets were independent from the rest 
of firm A’s operations. This course of action assumes that the transaction costs of selling the assets will be 
negligible. If the transaction costs are significant (e.g. due to the tacitness of these assets), it may be optimal for the 
firms to form a joint venture instead of selling the assets. 
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of the partner’s operations, it will have to reorganize a lot of its other activities and resources. 
This reorganization may in turn affect the performance of the focal firm because of 
interdependence between the partners. Such a chain reaction of adjustments may not occur if the 
partner is simple. Thus, the complexity of the partner may affect the focal firm’s performance. 
There is no theory that would suggest how the partner’s complexity might affect the focal 
firm’s performance. The growing literature on complexity and its effects on optimal search 
strategies (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 
2004) has made significant discoveries about the effects of firm complexity on its own 
performance. However, no studies have investigated th  effect of firm complexity on its 
partner’s performance. The study of this effect is the second goal of this paper. 
 
Decision-making structures in alliances 
 
The partners in an alliance can choose the degree and mode of coordination by choosing a 
specific decision-making structure (DMS; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988).  A DMS is a set of rules 
that determine who makes decisions and how those decisions are made (Stiglitz, 1989, 1991). In 
this essay, a DMS is defined as the rules that determin  (1) who makes proposals and (2) the 
criteria for evaluating these proposals. Conceptually, l decision-making structures can be 
placed along a continuum whose extreme ends are fully decentralized decision making and fully 
centralized decision making. Some alliances may use dec ntralized decision making, in which 
the proposals are evaluated based on their impact on the performance of the proposing firm 
without regard to the performance of the other partner or the entire alliance. Other alliances may 
use an alliance-centric (centralized) DMS which will evaluate proposals based on the 
performance of the entire alliance, ignoring the immediate interests of the partners (such a 
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decision-making structure is likely to be based on mutual forbearance and trust). Still other 
alliances may use a combined DMS, in which the proposed action will be evaluated based both 
on the performance of the proposing firm and the performance of the entire alliance.  
 While it is intuitively clear that employing differ nt DMS will likely affect the 
performance of the focal firm in different ways, it is more difficult to predict the effects of DMS 
choice on the focal firm’s performance based on theoretical reasoning. Maximizing individual 
gains may come at the price of lower alliance performance. Maximizing alliance performance 
may restrict the focal firm’s independent actions ad impose opportunity costs on the focal firm. 
It is worth noting here that DMS choice is not synonymous with the choice of a communication 
structure. The partners may communicate and share information freely under a decentralized 
DMS. Yet when it is the time to take action, each one f them may consider its own performance 
as the sole criterion. If the partners trust each other, they may allow each other to take such 
independent action. As the results of my simulations will suggest, it may be rational for the 
partners not to consider each other’s immediate interes s when making decisions. Arguably, such 
a DMS needs plenty of trust to function smoothly. 
 The effect of the chosen DMS on the performance of the focal firm will likely depend on 
the structural characteristics of the alliance (Hennart, 2006). The degree and asymmetry of 
interdependence between the partners will affect the costs and benefits of independent vs. 
coordinated action. The partners’ internal complexity will affect their behavior (Levinthal, 1997) 
which in turn will affect the focal firm’s performance if it is dependent on the partner. As in the 
case of DMS choice, it is difficult to predict conceptually the effects of interdependence and 
partner complexity on the focal firm’s performance. L t us consider the following hypothetical 
example. 
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 Firm A needs a partner in developing a new computer game. Both firms B and C have 
computer graphics technologies that could be used in the development process. B’s technology is 
simple: it consists of a few modules that weakly interact with one another. C’s technology is 
complex: it consists of many modules that densely interact with one another. If A chooses B as 
the partner, A’s actions may result in less “radical” responses by B because B will be able to 
fine-tune its technology module-by-module. If A chooses C as a partner, C may have to engage 
in broader system redesign following some of A’s actions. Such “radical” responses by C may 
affect A’s performance in negative ways if A is greatly dependent on C. Uncovering these effects 
of partner complexity and dependence on the focal firm is the goal of this paper. Complex 
systems such as alliances often exhibit surprising behavior even when they follow a few simple 
rules (Holland, 1992). This unpredictability of outcomes in alliances may be one reason why so 
many alliances fail (Park and Ungson, 2001). Thus, obtaining some results concerning the effects 
of these three factors may be a first step toward incorporating complexity into the theory of 
alliances.  
 
Research questions 
In this study, I am aiming to find answers to the following questions: 
1. How does the partner’s dependence on the focal firm affect the focal firm’s performance? 
2. How does the partner’s complexity affect the focal firm’s performance? 
3. How does the choice of a DMS affect the focal firm’s performance? In particular, how 
does DMS choice affect the relationships in question  (1) and (2)? 
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The model 
 
In order to find answers to the research questions, I ran a series of computer simulations using a 
variant of the NK[C] modeling technique (Kauffman, 1993; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Ganco & 
Agarwal, 2009). The choice of simulations as my research method was dictated by a few reasons. 
First, simulation-based research is a useful method of theory development (Davis, Eisenhardt, & 
Bingham, 2007). It is especially useful when data colle tion is difficult, measurement of the key 
constructs is a problem, and there is little theory t  generate empirically testable hypotheses. 
Second, simulation methods allow researchers to isolate the phenomenon of interest and study its 
effects without contamination from confounding factors. Finally, simulation results can be 
compared to prior empirical findings. If simulation results allow researchers to explain 
previously unexplained phenomena, their value is enhanced. 
My implementation of the NK[C] model is similar to he previous implementations in the 
literature with a few differences. I will describe my implementation of the model and highlight 
its differences from the previous implementations. 
 NK[C] models represent firms as vectors of interdependent decisions. This aspect of 
NK[C] models makes them especially suitable for studying interactions of decisions within and 
between firms, which is the main theme of this paper. K and C are the most important parameters 
of the model. Varying these parameters, I was able to model differences in the firms’ 
interdependence and internal complexity. Below is a description of all parameters of the model. 
 Parameter N represents the size of the entire alliance. In my models, the size of a firm is 
the number of decisions that this firm controls. For example, if partner 1 controls six decisions 
and partner 2 controls six decisions, the size of the alliance is therefore N = 12. The sizes of the 
two partners can be equal or non-equal. I modeled both equal and non-equal sizes to make sure 
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that my results are robust to differences in firm size . The overall size of the alliance in the 
model (the value of N) is not very important. Even small values (for example, six – see Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003) provide for meaningful variation and overall complexity of the model. 
Therefore, I chose to model the alliance of size N = 12. This value of N is in line with the 
majority of research that has used NK[C] models in the past (e.g. Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; 
Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006; Ganco & Agarwal, 2009). Much greater values of N reduce variation 
in the performance of the firms and exponentially increase computing time without providing 
any substantial new insights. 
 The decisions that each partner controls are assumed to be binary. This assumption is a 
realistic representation of reality. Managers often d cide whether to switch suppliers or not; 
whether to introduce a new compensation scheme or lave the old scheme in place; whether to 
buy a new technology or develop it internally; whether to use the new technology at all or keep 
perfecting the old technology; etc. In addition, the binary nature of decisions does not limit the 
generalizability of the results of NK[C] simulations (Levinthal, 1997).  
 Parameter K represents the internal complexity of a firm. Formally, K is the number of 
internal decisions of the firm that affect the payoff t  any particular decision. For example, if the 
payoff to a decision is not affected by any other dcisions, the value of K is zero. I called such a 
firm “simple.” When the value of K is greater than zero, the firm is more complex. For example, 
when K equals two, each decision’s payoff depends not o ly on the decision itself, but also on 
two other decisions that the focal firm has made. The greatest possible value of K is N-1. When 
K = N-1, the payoff to each decision depends on all the decisions that the firm has made. When 
K = N-1, the complexity of the firm is the highest possible for a firm of this size. The intuition 
behind calling the firm “simple” or “complex” dependi g on the value of K is as follows. Low 
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values of K mean that decisions are largely independent. When K equals zero, the firm’s 
managers can make each decision separately because none of the decisions affect each other’s 
payoffs. The task of managing such a firm becomes relatively simple. When K is greater than 
zero, interactions among decisions are present. In order to make one optimal decision, managers 
have to optimize K other decisions simultaneously. The problem of finding optimal decisions 
quickly becomes mathematically intractable even at rel tively small values of K (Rivkin, 2000). 
Thus, managers face much more complex problems whenK increases. Decision making 
becomes the most complex when K reaches the maximum possible value of N-1. 
 Considering the fact that there are two firms in my odels, I used two values of K: K1 
and K2. They correspond to internal complexities of partner 1 and partner 2, correspondingly. 
Parameter C represents the interdependence between he partners after they form an 
alliance. Here I depart from the ways C was operation l zed in Kauffman (1993) or Ganco & 
Agarwal (2009). In order to simplify the model and capture all the possible variation, I let C 
denote the total number of dependences of payoffs of the decisions of one partner on the 
decisions of the other partner. For example, if C equals two, it means that there are two different 
instances when some decision of partner 2 affects the payoff to some decision(s) of partner 1. 
 There could be two different values of C: C1 and C2. C1 is the number of dependences of 
payoffs to decisions of firm 1 on decisions of firm 2 (upper right quadrant); C2 is the number of 
dependences of payoffs to decisions of firm 2 on decisions of firm 1 (lower left quadrant). In 
general, C1 and C2 do not have to be equal. If C1 is greater than C2, it means that partner 1 is 
relatively more dependent on partner 2 than vice versa. The minimum possible value of C1 and 
C2 is zero, which would mean that one partner’s performance is completely independent of 
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anything that the other partner does. I modeled the values of C1 and C2 from 1 to N1 times N2 
(the maximum possible value of C1 and C2). 
 In my simulations, I allowed each parameter (K1, 2, C1, C2) to vary over the entire range 
of possible values. K1 (K2) varies from 0 to N1-1 (N2-1). C1 and C2 vary from 0 to N1*N2. My 
simulations thus cover all possible parameter combinations.  
 Now I would like to show how the parameters correspond to the research questions that I 
formulated earlier. Research Question 1 asked how te degree of dependence of partner 2 on the 
focal firm affected the performance of the focal firm. To answer this question, I will be looking 
at the effect of parameter C2 on the performance of the focal firm. Research Question 2 asked 
how the internal complexity of partner 2 affected the performance of the focal firm. To answer 
this question, I will be looking at the effect of parameter K2 on the performance of the focal firm. 
Finally, Research Question 3 asked how the chosen decision-making structure affected the 
performance of the focal firm. To answer this question, I will vary the chosen DMS and observe 
its effect on the performance of the focal firm. 
 
Calculation of the performance of the partners and the alliance 
 
Following previous research (e.g. Levinthal, 1997, Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), I 
calculated the performance of the partners and the alliance as follows. At the start of each 
simulation run, I assigned a random value from the uniform distribution U[0,1] to each possible 
combination of decisions of the two partners. These values were stored in a large array. During 
simulation runs, the performance contribution of each decision was taken from this array. 
Consider the situation in Fig. 2. The payoff to decision 3 of partner 2 depends on this decision as 
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well as on decisions 2 and 3 of partner 1. Given th binary nature of the decisions, there are eight 
(23) possible combinations of those decisions. Thus, the program accessed one of eight randomly 
generated numbers depending on the values of the decisions. The resulting number was the 
payoff to decision 3 of partner 2 considering the values of decisions 2 and 3 of partner 1. Payoffs 
to all the decisions of each firm were computed in th s manner. The program always explicitly 
considered all interactions of decisions. The performance of each partner was calculated as a 
simple average of payoffs to all decisions. Formally, Pj = (ΣijDij (D11, … DN1,1, D12, …, DN2, 
2))/Nj, where Pj is the performance of partner j; Dij is the payoff to decision i of partner j 
considering its dependence on other decisions made by the partners; Nj is the size of partner j. 
 The performance of the alliance was calculated similarly. The program calculated the 
performance of the combined venture as if it were on  big firm. Mathematically, the performance 
of the combined venture was a weighted average of the performance values of the two partners 
considering their size. 
 
The behavior of the partners and search for strategies 
 
When there are multiple interactions of decisions within and between the partners, the best-
performing combination of decisions is difficult to find (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000). Given my assumption of bounded rationality of the decision makers, the partners were 
forced to engage in local search. Local search was implemented as varying one decision at a 
time. At each step of the search process, the partners ook turns performing the following 
procedure. One partner chose one decision at random and flipped this decision’s value (from 
zero to one or from one to zero). Then the program c lculated the performance of each partner 
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and of the entire alliance after this change. Depending on the decision-making structure adopted 
for this simulation run, the change was either accepted or rejected. The partners took turns in 
offering such proposals of change. When the performance of the partners and the alliance had 
stopped improving, the program recorded this achieved long-term performance value. The 
program performed 10,000 simulation runs with each possible set of parameter values. 
  
Implementation of decision-making structures 
 
Each decision-making structure was implemented as a set of rules that specified how the decision 
was allowed to affect the performance of the partners and the alliance. In the decentralized 
decision-making structure, the partners took turns offering proposals. A proposed change was 
accepted if it improved the performance of the proposing partner without regard to its effect on 
the performance of the other partner. In consensus-based decision-making structures, the partners 
took turns offering proposals. A proposed change was accepted if it improved the performance of 
the proposing partner and did not decrease the performance of the alliance. In the centralized 
decision-making structure, the partners took turns offering proposals. A proposed change was 
accepted if it improved the performance of the alliance. The difference between the consensus-
based structure and the centralized structure lies in their treatment of the performance of 
individual partners. The centralized structure does not concern itself with the performance of 
either partner: the only criterion for evaluating pro osals is the performance of the entire 
alliance. Under the consensus-based structure, the performance of the proposing firm is an 
important criterion for evaluating a proposal. Under the centralized structure, the proposing firm 
may suggest an action that hurts its own immediate performance. Such altruism may seem 
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improbable outside a merger, yet it is still possible. For example, in the case of an equity joint 
venture, the partners may be chiefly concerned withmaximizing the performance of the entire 
venture. It may be rational for each one to be willing to take small, temporary losses if they lead 
to large, long-term gains. In addition, the partners may have developed significant trust in each 
other, e.g. as a result of repeated collaboration (Gulati, 1995). Not only might they be willing to 
sacrifice their immediate performance for large long-term gain of the whole alliance, but they 
might also have the means of coordinating their actons via more complete contracts (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). As a result, the partners may have the contractual means of ensuring that one 
partner’s sacrifice for the common gain will be compensated.  
 
Results 
 
In order to answer the research questions, let us examine the following graphs. In each graph 
presented in this paper, the potential performance values of the focal firm run from 0 to 1000. 
Each graph only shows part of this range in order to make the result more visually salient. 
 Each graph is to be interpreted as follows: the graphs show expected long-run 
performance of the focal firm under different scenarios. Each bar in the graphs represents a 
different alliance with a specific set of parameters. 
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The effects of partner dependence on the focal firm’s performance 
 
Figure 6: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  dependence in the case of 
decentralized decision making. Each firm is moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). The focal firm 
is moderately dependent on its partner (C1 = 10). The parameter that changes is the dependence 
of the partner on the focal firm. 
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Figure 7: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  dependence in the case of 
consensus-based decision making. Each firm is moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). The focal 
firm is moderately dependent on its partner (C1 = 10). The parameter that changes is the 
dependence of the partner on the focal firm. 
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Figure 8: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  dependence in the case of 
centralized decision making. Each firm is moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). The focal firm is 
moderately dependent on its partner (C1 = 10). The parameter that changes is the dependence of 
the partner on the focal firm. 
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In all three graphs, the performance of the focal firm declines when the partner’s dependence on 
the focal firm grows. For example, in Fig. 6, the focal firm’s performance is 700 when its 
partner’s dependence on the focal firm is low. When the partner’s dependence on the focal firm 
is moderate, the focal firm’s performance declines to 697 (a small but significant decline). And 
when the same focal firm allies with a partner thatis significantly dependent on the focal firm, its 
performance is only 693. Thus, allying with more dependent partners under decentralized 
decision making, the focal firm loses up to seven poi ts in performance, ceteris paribus. Similar 
but more pronounced dynamics are observable under oth decision-making structures. 
According to Fig. 7, this difference in performance increases to 35 points when the alliance is 
using the consensus-based decision-making structure. Finally, in the case of a centralized 
decision-making structure, the focal firm loses 47 points allying with a partner that is highly 
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dependent on the focal firm compared to the baseline case of allying with a partner that has low 
dependence on the focal firm (Fig. 8). 
 This result is unexpected from the point of view of existing theories. Neither RDT nor 
TCE can explain it. In fact, we might expect increas d performance of the focal firm as a result 
of increased partner dependence on the focal firm. The negative effect of partner dependence on 
the focal firm’s performance requires an explanation within the theoretical framework of 
complexity used in this paper. 
 I would like to begin the explanation with the most straightforward case: the consensus-
based decision-making structure (Fig. 7). It will be recalled that under consensus-based decision 
making, each proposal was evaluated according to two criteria: (1) its effect on the performance 
of the proposing partner; (2) its effect on the performance of the entire alliance. The performance 
of the entire alliance was conceptualized as the sum total of the performance values of both 
partners. Thus, according to criteria (1) and (2), any proposal was accepted if it improved the 
performance of the proposing partner by more than te loss to the other partner. Weak partner 
dependence on the focal firm meant that the focal firm’s actions did not affect the partner’s 
performance much. In this case, the focal firm was relatively free to make decisions without 
consulting with its partner. If the focal firm allied with a partner that was significantly dependent 
on the focal firm, the partner’s performance was often affected when the focal firm proposed an 
action. Quite often, the partner’s performance would be negatively affected by the focal firm’s 
actions, and the size of this loss would be greater than the gain to the focal firm. Thus, such 
proposals were vetoed and the focal firm suffered opportunity costs because it had to forego an 
opportunity to improve its performance. The more dependent its partner became, the more often 
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such a situation occurred and the more often the focal firm suffered opportunity costs. Thus, the 
focal firm’s performance was lower when the partner was more dependent on the focal firm. 
 A similar logic applies in the case of centralized decision making (Fig. 8). Under 
centralized decision making, a proposal was accepted if it improved the performance of the 
entire alliance regardless of its effects on the performance of the individual partners. If the 
partner had low dependence on the focal firm, it was often possible to improve the performance 
of the focal firm without affecting the performance of the partner much. As a result, the 
performance of the entire alliance improved and the proposed change was implemented. When 
the partner was significantly dependent on the focal firm, many decisions that would have 
resulted in performance gains for the focal firm would also have decreased the partner’s 
performance by a significant value. Often, this drop in the partner’s performance was greater 
than the gain in the performance of the focal firm, and the performance of the entire alliance 
would suffer. As a result, such a change was vetoed and the focal firm suffered an opportunity 
cost. The greater the partner’s dependence on the focal firm, the more often the focal firm 
suffered opportunity costs and the lower was its performance. 
 Now let us consider the most challenging case: the decentralized DMS. As Fig. 6 shows, 
the focal firm’s performance was negatively affected by allying with a partner that was heavily 
dependent on the focal firm. The principal differenc  between the decentralized DMS and the 
other DMS’s is the lack of coordination between the partners in the decentralized structure. 
Under decentralized decision making, each firm was free to make any decisions and take any 
actions. This means that each firm only tried to improve its own performance without regard to 
the externalities it would impose on its partner. The logic that I used to explain performance 
drops in the case of consensus-based and centralized DMS does not apply here. Each firm was 
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free to pursue any opportunity without consulting with its partner. Thus, there were no 
opportunity costs. When the focal firm made a decision that affected its partner’s performance, 
this action forced the partner to react and adjust its strategy and operations. The more dependent 
the partner was on the focal firm, the more it was affected by the focal firm’s actions and the 
more it had to do to compensate for those actions. Considering the fact that the focal firm was 
also dependent on its partner, the partner’s response also affected the focal firm’s performance. 
This effect was more often negative than positive because the firms were in essence disrupting 
each other’s adaptation. Thus, the focal firm’s long-run performance suffered when its partner 
was heavily dependent on the focal firm. 
 To test this logic, let us conduct the following exp riment. The focal firm’s performance 
was negatively affected by its partner’s dependence be ause the focal firm was also significantly 
dependent on the partner. Following this logic, we would expect this effect to diminish or 
disappear if the focal firm’s dependence on its partner was minimal. To illustrate this effect, let 
us consider Fig. 9 where the focal firm’s dependence on its partner is low. 
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Figure 9: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  dependence in the case of 
decentralized decision making. Each firm is moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). The focal firm’s 
dependence on its partner is low (C1 = 2). The parameter that changes is the dependence of the 
partner on the focal firm. 
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Fig. 9 confirms the reasoning provided previously. The main cause of diminished performance of 
the focal firm under decentralized decision making when its partner is highly dependent on the 
focal firm is the dependence of the focal firm on the partner.  
Interestingly, another confirmation of this logic comes from Fig. 10. In Fig. 10, the focal 
firm also has low dependence on its partner. The diff rence between Figs. 9 and 10 is the DMS: 
In Fig. 9, the partners employ decentralized decision making while in Fig. 10 they employ 
consensus-based decision making. We can see that in Fig. 10 the focal firm’s performance 
follows the now familiar pattern, declining with anincrease in its partner’s dependence on the 
focal firm. The performance of the focal firm when its partner has low dependence on the focal 
firm is 703. The performance of the focal firm when its partner is highly dependent on the focal 
firm is 682. Thus, the focal firm loses 21 points in performance from allying with a highly 
dependent partner compared to the baseline case of allying with a low-dependent partner. It will 
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be recalled that this difference was 35 points when t  focal firm was moderately but 
significantly dependent on its partner (see Fig. 8). Thus, the negative effect of partner 
dependence on the focal firm’s performance is a sum of two separate effects: (1) The opportunity 
costs stemming from the fact that the focal firm often foregoes opportunities to improve its 
performance due to their negative impact on the partner’s performance; (2) The negative 
externalities that the partner’s actions impose on the focal firm’s performance. 
 
Figure 10: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  dependence in the case of 
consensus-based decision making. Each firm is moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). The focal 
firm’s dependence on its partner is low (C1 = 2). The parameter that changes is the dependence 
of the partner on the focal firm. 
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The effects of partner complexity on the focal firm’s performance 
 
In order to answer Research Question 2, let us examine the following graphs. Each one shows 
the performance of the focal firm as a function of its partner’s complexity while keeping 
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interdependence between the partners constant. It will be recalled that each bar represents a 
separate alliance with a specific set of parameters. 
 
Figure 11: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  complexity in the case of 
decentralized decision making. The focal firm is moderately complex (K1 = 2). Both partners are 
moderately dependent on each other (C1 = C2 = 10). The parameter that changes is the internal 
complexity of the partner. 
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Figure 12: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  complexity in the case of 
consensus-based decision making. The focal firm is oderately complex (K1 = 2). Both partners 
are moderately dependent on each other (C1 = C2 = 10). The parameter that changes is the 
internal complexity of the partner. 
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Figure 13: Performance of the focal firm as a function of partne  complexity in the case of 
centralized decision making. The focal firm is moderat ly complex (K1 = 2). Both partners are 
moderately dependent on each other (C1 = C2 = 10). The parameter that changes is the internal 
complexity of the partner. 
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Figs. 11-13 show that the performance of the focal firm is affected by its partner’s complexity. 
However, the direction and magnitude of this effect depend on the chosen decision-making 
structure. In the case of a decentralized DMS (Fig. 11), the performance of the focal firm is 
positively affected by its partner’s complexity. In the case of a consensus-based DMS and 
centralized DMS (Figs. 12 and 13, respectively), the performance of the focal firm is negatively 
affected by its partner’s complexity. The negative eff ct is most pronounced in the case of a 
centralized DMS (34 points in Fig. 13). The negative effect in the case of a consensus-based 
DMS is ten points (Fig. 12). 
 The difference in the sign and magnitude of the eff ct of partner complexity on the 
performance of the focal firm deserves an explanatio . I would like to start with explaining the 
highly negative effect under a centralized DMS (Fig. 13). It will be recalled that under 
centralized decision making, all decisions were made in the interests of the entire alliance 
without any regard to the effect of those decisions  the individual performance of either 
partner. Greater internal complexity of the partner m ans that it has a larger number of 
potentially high-performing combinations of activites and decisions (Levinthal, 1997). Also, the 
performance differences among those combinations of decisions tend to be greater in a highly 
complex partner (Levinthal, 1997). As a result, it makes sense to concentrate the search for well-
performing strategies on the more complex partner. The less complex focal firm serves as an 
assistant in this process and bears individual costs of coordination, which tend to be lower than 
the gains of the more complex partner. The question of whether the focal firm will be 
compensated for this sacrifice is beyond the results of hese simulations7. 
                                                          
7 For example, the partners may agree on side payments to compensate one another for temporary losses in 
individual performance. It may be difficult to set up such a compensation scheme if the gains and losses of each 
party are not perfectly measurable. Firms may also enter an alliance with the goal of maximizing their own 
performance, not the joint gains.  
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 Next, let us consider the case of a consensus-based DMS (Fig. 12). It will be recalled that 
under consensus-based decision-making, each partner ca  only proceed with an action if it (1) 
improves the performance of the focal firm and (2) does not damage the performance of the 
entire alliance. If the partner is highly complex, it can often find a change that will improve its 
own performance significantly while decreasing the performance of the focal firm by a smaller 
margin. According to the rules of the consensus-based DMS, the partner will proceed with this 
action. Thus, the focal firm will bear the cost of c ordination while allowing its partner to 
improve the partner’s performance. 
 Finally, let us consider the case of a decentralized DMS (Fig. 11). Under this DMS, each 
firm is free to take any action that improves its own performance without regard to the 
performance of its partner. According to Fig. 8, the focal firm actually gains from allying with a 
highly complex partner, as opposed to the cases of consensus-based and centralized decision 
making. This gain is small (five points) but significant. Let us compare the performance of the 
focal firm under the decentralized and consensus-based DMS (Figs. 11 and 12). When its 
partner’s complexity is low, the focal firm’s perfomance is virtually equal under both DMS: 694 
under the decentralized DMS and 692 under the consensu -based DMS. When the partner is 
moderately complex, the focal firm performs better under the decentralized DMS than under the 
consensus-based DMS (697 vs. 687). Finally, when th partner is highly complex, the focal firm 
under the decentralized DMS performs much better than e focal firm under the consensus-
based DMS (699 vs. 682). These performance differentials hold a clue to the answer. When the 
partner is complex, it faces potentially many different well-performing combinations of activities 
and decisions. As a result, such a partner will engage in more intensive search for a well-
performing strategy and will often make changes to its activities. The focal firm is dependent on 
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its partner, which means that its performance will be affected by its partner’s search. The 
partner’s actions may disrupt the focal firm’s short-te m performance but at the same time they 
may open up new opportunities for development and thereby help the focal firm improve its 
long-term performance. This effect is similar to escape from a competency trap (Siggelkow and 
Levinthal, 2005). A competency trap is a situation in which the firm has converged on a locally 
optimal strategy that is globally suboptimal. The focal firm will be unable to break out of the 
competency trap until its structure of payoffs changes. Such a change may occur due to 
environmental changes or actions of its partner. Escapes from competency traps will be more 
limited under the consensus-based DMS. Many of the partner’s proposals under consensus-based 
decision making will be rejected by the focal firm precisely because they lead to significant 
0short-term declines in the performance of the focal firm. This result resolves a seeming paradox 
and presents one more reason why relational, trust-based governance in alliance is beneficial 
(Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006). When the partners trust each other, they may be 
willing to take small temporary losses because theyknow that a larger long-term gain will likely 
follow. 
 
The effects of the chosen DMS on the focal firm’s performance 
 
The previous discussion has shown how the chosen DMS affects the relationships between the 
partner’s complexity and the focal firm’s performance and between the partner’s dependence on 
the focal firm and the focal firm’s performance. I would like to present the main effect of the 
chosen DMS on the focal firm’s performance. Let us consider the graphs in Figs. 14-16. 
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Figure 14: Performance of the focal firm as a function of the c osen DMS. The focal firm and 
its partner are moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). Both partners are moderately dependent on 
each other (C1 = C2 = 10). The parameter that changes is the chosen DMS. 
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Figure 15: Performance of the focal firm as a function of the c osen DMS. The focal firm and 
its partner are moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). Both partners have low dependence on each 
other (C1 = C2 = 2). The parameter that changes is the chosen DMS. 
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Figure 16: Performance of the focal firm as a function of the c osen DMS. The focal firm and 
its partner are moderately complex (K1 = K2 = 2). Both partners are strongly dependent on each 
other (C1 = C2 = 25). The parameter that changes is the chosen DMS. 
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Figs. 14-16 demonstrate non-linear effects of DMS choice. Under moderate and low 
interdependence (Figs. 14 and 15), the focal firm performs the worst under a consensus-based 
DMS. The decentralized DMS brings small but positive performance benefits to the focal firm, 
while the centralized DMS brings the best performance to the focal firm. When the two partners 
are highly interdependent (Fig. 16), the focal firm performs the worst under the decentralized 
DMS, somewhat better under the consensus-based DMS,and much better under the centralized 
DMS. These results show the contingent benefits of consensus-seeking and decentralization. In 
many alliances where the partners are not very strongly interdependent, decentralization may be 
better for the focal firm than consensus-based coordination. However, if the partners are strongly 
interdependent, the best they can do is forego any individual interests and concentrate on the 
performance of the entire alliance.  
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Robustness of the results  
 
In order to check whether the results hold over a wide variety of parameters, I ran the simulations 
with all possible combinations of values of parameters K1, K2, C1, C2, and DMS. Table 1 shows 
the long-run performance of the focal firm for various parameter combinations under different 
DMS. Overall, the pattern of the results is the same as reported above. The effect size tends to be 
the strongest at high levels of dependence between the partners and low levels of complexity of 
the focal firm. 
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Table 6: Long-run performance of the focal firm. First number in each cell: Decentralized DMS. 
Second number in each cell: Consensus-based DMS. Third number in each cell: Centralized 
DMS. 
 
 C1=2 
C2=2 
C1=2 
C2=10 
C1=2 
C2=25 
C1=10 
C2=2 
C1=10 
C2=10 
C1=10 
C2=25 
C1=25 
C2=2 
C1=25 
C2=10 
C1=25 
C2=25 
K1=0 
K2=0 
668 
666 
673 
665 
663 
649 
661 
658 
635 
664 
666 
717 
655 
659 
695 
645 
647 
673 
658 
671 
739 
635 
672 
718 
609 
666 
701 
K1=0 
K2=2 
666 
665 
667 
667 
662 
640 
665 
652 
628 
664 
666 
698 
664 
655 
670 
658 
629 
647 
663 
671 
720 
649 
664 
695 
628 
640 
673 
K1=0 
K2=5 
665 
666 
663 
666 
658 
635 
667 
647 
622 
666 
664 
682 
665 
649 
647 
665 
618 
623 
665 
669 
700 
661 
655 
668 
649 
625 
644 
K1=2 
K2=0 
705 
702 
717 
704 
695 
697 
702 
688 
675 
699 
699 
739 
694 
692 
721 
685 
674 
698 
695 
701 
741 
676 
697 
729 
647 
685 
709 
K1=2 
K2=2 
705 
703 
709 
704 
692 
689 
704 
682 
668 
700 
699 
723 
697 
687 
702 
693 
664 
676 
697 
700 
728 
685 
691 
710 
664 
669 
687 
K1=2 
K2=5 
703 
701 
705 
706 
693 
686 
703 
678 
665 
702 
699 
710 
699 
682 
687 
696 
658 
658 
698 
699 
716 
692 
683 
693 
681 
658 
665 
K1=5 
K2=0 
686 
684 
702 
687 
681 
692 
687 
675 
673 
677 
679 
722 
678 
680 
717 
676 
672 
701 
676 
680 
719 
669 
681 
716 
656 
678 
706 
K1=5 
K2=2 
686 
684 
693 
685 
679 
685 
688 
669 
667 
680 
680 
705 
679 
676 
697 
679 
662 
678 
677 
679 
705 
670 
678 
700 
664 
664 
687 
K1=5 
K2=5 
684 
685 
691 
687 
678 
681 
688 
669 
663 
678 
679 
694 
679 
670 
682 
680 
655 
661 
676 
679 
694 
672 
671 
685 
669 
656 
666 
 
Based on the results of the simulations, I can formulate the following propositions: 
1. The focal firm’s performance in an alliance is negatively affected by its partner’s 
dependence on the focal firm. 
2. The focal firm’s performance is negatively affected by its partner’s complexity under 
centralized decision making. 
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3. The focal firm’s performance is negatively affected by its partner’s complexity under 
consensus-based decision making when the partner is significantly dependent on the 
focal firm. 
4. The focal firm’s performance is positively affected by its partner’s complexity under 
decentralized decision making. This effect is strongest when the focal firm is simple 
and greatly dependent on its partner.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results of the simulations suggest that the process of coordination in alliances may affect the 
firms’ performance in ways that can be predicted in advance. In particular, the results show that 
greater partner dependence on the focal firm results in ower performance of the focal firm. The 
effect of partner complexity on the focal firm’s performance is more varied: under decentralized 
decision making, the focal firm tends to benefits from high complexity of its partner while under 
consensus-based and centralized decision making the focal firm’s performance tends to suffer 
from high partner complexity. Finally, the results suggest that the decision-making structure 
chosen for the alliance affects the performance of the focal firm. 
 The results reported here suggest that there may be nother group of factors affecting 
firm performance in alliances that has not been studied before. Previous research has found that 
firm performance in alliances depends on private and common benefits (Khanna, Gulati, & 
Nohria, 1998), network diversity (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005), technological diversity (Sampson, 
2007), partner’s reputation and technological resources (Stuart, 2000), etc. No previous studies 
have explicitly considered individual performance eff cts of coordination under interdependence. 
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The results reported in this paper suggest that firm performance in an alliance may also depend 
on the structure of interdependence between the partners, the structure of resource interactions 
within the partners’ organizations, and the chosen d cision-making structure. Firms may bear 
individual costs and enjoy individual benefits during long-term collaboration. Some of these 
costs and benefits in an alliance cannot be written nto a contract. Moreover, their gradual 
emergence in the long process of coordination suggests that partners may have trouble sharing 
them even when there is full trust and goodwill. 
  
External validity of the results: Explanation of the findings of Gulati and Sytch 
(2007) 
 
Simulation research is often seen as unrealistic due to its simplifying assumptions and models 
that only capture a few aspects of reality. In order to demonstrate the external validity of the 
results, I would like to show how these results predict and explain findings of existing empirical 
research (as suggested by Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007). In a study of the U.S. auto 
industry, Gulati & Sytch (2007) found that the performance of the auto manufacturers declined 
when their suppliers were greatly dependent on them. This result contradicts the logic of power-
dependence proposed by Emerson (1962). According to this logic, the less dependent side in a 
relationship enjoys a power advantage. This advantage c n be used to bargain for more 
advantageous terms and therefore should positively affect the performance of the less dependent 
side. However, Gulati & Sytch (2007) found the opposite result. In order to explain this result, 
Gulati and Sytch used the concept of cohesion (Emerson, 1962) which refers to close 
collaboration between greatly interdependent partners. One problem with this explanation is that 
a relationship will exhibit cohesion when both partne s are significantly and equally dependent 
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on each other. Besides, cohesion is a desirable quaity if it results in greater collaboration. A 
possible agency theory explanation of this phenomenn is that the highly dependent supplier 
might enjoy free-riding benefits at the expense of the auto manufacturer. However, the auto 
manufacturer should be able to switch suppliers easily when this happens. Besides, Gulati and 
Sytch (2007) found no evidence of free-riding on the part of the suppliers. Thus, existing theories 
do not adequately explain the phenomenon reported by Gulati & Sytch (2007). The present study 
suggests that the negative performance effect of greate  supplier dependence might have been a 
side effect of coordination under interdependence. As shown in Figs. 3-5, greater partner 
dependence results in lower performance of the focal irm under all decision-making structures. 
In fact, greater coordination between the partners may have exacerbated the problem.  
Theoretical significance of the present study is in its novel approach to the investigation 
of factors that affect firm performance in alliances. The present study shows that coordination 
under complex interdependence in alliances may haveunexpected side effects. The following 
findings are a contribution to the theory of alliances:  
(1) Some costs and benefits in alliances are never shared yet they do not result from knowledge 
leaks (thus they cannot be called private benefits in he sense proposed by Khanna, Gulati, & 
Nohria, 1998). These costs and benefits result fromlong-term externalities that the partners 
impose on each other due to their interdependence. Decreasing interdependence between the 
partners is the only way to solve this problem. However, it would come at a cost. 
Interdependence is the outcome of sharing of resources and activities. The partners cannot share 
resources and activities yet remain independent. Thus, t e partners face a tradeoff between 
greater potential side effects of interdependence ad lower potential benefits from collaboration 
when little resource and activity sharing takes place. 
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(2) As the simulations show, the performance of the focal firm depends on the structural 
characteristics of interdependence and on the partner’s internal complexity. Firms do not usually 
choose partners based on these characteristics. They are more likely to look at the value of the 
potential partner’s resources (Stuart, 2000), the fit between the corporate cultures (Pothukuchi et 
al., 2002), the potential partner’s reputation (Saxton, 1997), etc. However, once the partner has 
been chosen, its internal complexity will affect the performance of the focal firm. In addition, the 
nature of interdependence between the partners is likely to be determined by the technologies 
that the partners possess and the goals of the alliance. As a result, the focal firm may not have 
much choice regarding the structure of interdependence. However, the decision-making structure 
is a parameter that can be chosen. The results of this study suggest that DMS choice can affect 
the performance of the focal firm.  
(3) Equity joint ventures are not always the answer to the problem of coordination and incentives 
because of individually experienced benefits and costs. Hennart (2006) suggested that separating 
all alliance activities and resources into a free standing joint venture is a good idea. However, the 
partners may be unable to create such a free-standing JV that will be isolated from the rest of 
their operations. The resources and activities needed in the JV may also be needed in other areas 
unrelated to the JV. Besides, some capabilities that are needed for the JV may be systemic and 
reside in complex interactions of each partner’s resources. In this case, each partner will 
individually bear costs of coordination. The fact that the alliance is structured as an equity JV 
does not change the individual nature of those costs. The only way for one of the partners to fully 
internalize all the costs and benefits experienced by the other partner is to acquire it. 
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Limitations  
 
The present study has a few limitations which set boundary conditions on the results and suggest 
opportunities for further research. One limitation s the chosen definition of dependence as the 
impact of one partner’s actions on the other partner’s performance. This kind of dependence is 
most likely in alliances in which there is significant sharing of resources, activities, operations, 
etc. These alliances are likely to involve joint development of new products or technologies. The 
results reported in this paper are probably less applicable to licensing alliances or partnerships 
involving the supply of well-defined resources and services over a set period of time.  
 The second limitation is assumption of lack of opprtunism and power games. Both 
partners in the simulations were assumed to always follow the contract. While this assumption 
may seem unrealistic, it was necessary to show that there may exist individual costs and benefits 
that are not the result of opportunism but are sideeffects of coordination under interdependence. 
Future research will undoubtedly incorporate opportunism and power games into this model. 
 The choice of simulations as a research method is another limitation of the study. The 
NK[C] model is a simplification of reality. It was not created to capture all the nuances of 
collaboration in alliances. However, NK[C] models do capture one important aspect of alliances: 
interdependence of the partners. The strength of NK[C] models is in being able to study 
interdependence at a much finer-grained level than t which is often used in alliance research 
(e.g. the usual distinction among pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence – see Gulati 
& Singh, 1998). The results generated by the simulations are empirically testable. During 
empirical testing, researchers will be able to set up more realistic models that will incorporate 
interdependence as one of the factors affecting firm performance.  
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Conclusion 
 
The present study has shown that the performance of the focal firm may depend on such factors 
as the degree of partner dependence on the focal firm, the internal complexity of the partner, and 
the chosen decision-making structure. These results ggest that there is another group of factors 
that may affect the performance of firms in alliances. These results are empirically testable. One 
of the results (a negative effect of partner dependence on the focal firm’s performance) predicts 
and explains an empirical phenomenon that has not been adequately explained before.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
References 
 
Aggarwal, V. A., Siggelkow, N., & Singh, H. 2011. Governing collaborative activity: 
Interdependence and the impact of coordination and exploration. Strategic Management 
Journal, 32(7): 705-730.  
 
Casciaro, T. & Piskorski, M. J. 2005. Power Imbalance, Mutual Dependence, and Constraint 
Absorption: A Closer Look at Resource Dependence Theory. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 50(2): 167-199. 
 
Collis, D. J. 1994. Research Note: How Valuable are Organizational Capabilities? Strategic 
Management Journal, 15(S1): 143-152. 
 
Cyert, R. M., March, J.G. 1963. A behavioral Theory of the Firm: Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Davis, J. P., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Bingham, C. B. 2007. Developing Theory Through Simulation 
Methods. Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 480-499. 
 
Emerson, R. M. 1962. Power-Dependence Relations. American Sociological Review, 27(1): 31-
41. 
 
Ethiraj, S. K. & Levinthal, D. 2004. Modularity and Innovation in Complex Systems. 
Management Science, 50(2): 159-173. 
 
Foss, N. J. 1996. Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical 
Comments. Organization Science, 7(5): 470-476. 
 
Ganco, M. & Agarwal, R. 2009. Performance Differentials Between Diversifying Entrants and 
Entrepreneurial Start-Ups: A Complexity Approach. Academy of Management Review, 
34(2): 228-252. 
 
Gavetti, G. & Levinthal, D. 2000. Looking Forward and Looking Backward: Cognitive and 
Experiential Search. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(1): 113-137. 
 
Gerwin, D. 2004. Coordinating New Product Development in Strategic Alliances. The Academy 
of Management Review, 29(2): 241-257. 
 
Goerzen, A. & Beamish, P. W. 2005. The effect of alliance network diversity on multinational 
enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(4): 333-354. 
 
Grant, R. M. 1991. The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for 
Strategy Formulation. California Management Review, 33(3): 114-135. 
 
Gulati, R. 1998. Alliances and Networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4): 293-317. 
 
122 
 
Gulati, R. & Singh, H. 1998. The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs 
and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
43(4): 781-814. 
 
Gulati, R. 1999. Network Location and Learning: The Influence of Network Resources and Firm 
Capabilities on Alliance Formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20(5): 397-420. 
 
Gulati, R. & Sytch, M. 2007. Dependence Asymmetry and Joint Dependence in 
Interorganizational Relationships: Effects of Embeddedness on a Manufacturer's 
Performance in Procurement Relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 32-
69. 
 
Hennart, J.-F. 1988. A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(4): 361-374. 
 
Hennart, J.-F. 2006. Alliance Research: Less is More. Journal of Management Studies, 43(7): 
1621-1628. 
 
Holland, J. H. 1992. Complex Adaptive Systems. Daedalus, 121(1): 17-30. 
 
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., & Vaidyanath, D. 2002. Alliance Management as a Source of 
Competitive Advantage. Journal of Management, 28(3): 413-446. 
 
Kauffman, S. A. 1993. The origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution: 
Oxford University Press, NY. 
 
Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. 1998. The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition, 
Cooperation, and Relative Scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3): 193-210. 
 
Krishnan, R., Martin, X., & Noorderhaven, N. G. 2006. When Does Trust Matter to Alliance 
Performance? Academy of Management Journal, 49(5): 894-917. 
 
Levinthal, D. A. 1997. Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes. Management Science, 43(7): 934-
950. 
 
March, J. G., Simon, Herbert A. 1958. Organizations: New York: Wiley. 
 
Park, S. H. & Ungson, G. R. 2001. Interfirm Rivalry and Managerial Complexity: A Conceptual 
Framework of Alliance Failure. Organization Science, 12(1): 37-53. 
 
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective: New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Pothukuchi, V., Damanpour, F., Choi, J., Chen, C. C., & Park, S. H. 2002. National and 
Organizational Culture Differences and International Joint Venture Performance. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 33(2): 243-265. 
123 
 
 
Rivkin, J. W. 2000. Imitation of Complex Strategies. Management Science, 46(6): 824-844. 
 
Rivkin, J. W. & Siggelkow, N. 2003. Balancing Search and Stability: Interdependencies among 
Elements Organizational Design. Management Science, 49(3): 290-311. 
 
Sah, R. K. & Stiglitz, J. E. 1986. The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and 
Polyarchies. The American Economic Review, 76(4): 716-727. 
 
Sah, R. K. & Stiglitz, J. E. 1988. Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies. The Economic 
Journal, 98(391): 451-470. 
 
Sampson, R. C. 2007. R&D alliances and firm performance: The impact of technological 
diversity and alliance organization on innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(2): 364-386. 
 
Saxton, T. 1997. The Effects of Partner and Relationship Characteristics on Alliance Outcomes. 
The Academy of Management Journal, 40(2): 443-461. 
 
Siggelkow, N. & Levinthal, D. A. 2005. Escaping real (non-benign) competency traps: linking 
the dynamics of organizational structure to the dynamics of search. Strategic 
Organization, 3(1): 85-115. 
 
Siggelkow, N. & Rivkin, J. W. 2006. When Exploration Backfires: Unintended Consequences of 
Multilevel Organizational Search. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 779-795. 
 
Simon, H. A. 1962. The Architecture of Complexity. Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 106(6): 467-482. 
 
Stuart, T. E. 2000. Interorganizational Alliances and the Performance of Firms: A Study of 
Growth and Innovation Rates in a High-Technology Industry. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(8): 791-811. 
 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational 
contracting: Free Press: New York, NY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
APPENDIX: Performance differentials of various decision-making 
structures 
 
Table 7 
Difference in performance between divisional and decentralized structures 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Independent variables Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 25.699 .614  41.879 .000 
INTERDEPEND .642 .011 .119 59.124 .000 
COMPLEXITY -5.008 .057 -.169 -87.832 .000 
ASYMMETRY -.957 .019 -.099 -50.709 .000 
INTERACTION_INTERDEPE
ND_ 
COMPLEXITY 
-.214 .004 -.100 -52.198 .000 
COMPLEXITY_SQUARED .734 .021 .068 35.420 .000 
DIFF_SIZE .013 .068 .000 .196 .845 
a. Dependent Variable: Difference in performance betwe n Divisional and Decentralized 
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Table 8 
 
Performance difference between consensus and decentralized structures 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Independent variables Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 9.430 .620  15.205 .000 
INTERDEPEND .402 .011 .075 36.590 .000 
COMPLEXITY -3.784 .058 -.128 -65.661 .000 
ASYMMETRY -.680 .019 -.071 -35.624 .000 
INTERACTION_COMPLEXITY
_INTERDEPEND 
-.181 .004 -.085 -43.643 .000 
COMPLEXITY_SQUARED .678 .021 .063 32.350 .000 
DIFF_SIZE .481 .068 .015 7.030 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Difference in performance betwe n consensus-based structure and 
decentralized structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
